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ARTICLES
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION MELTDOWN:
"PENN STATE THREE" CASE ILLUSTRATES
ENTITY REPRESENTATION PITFALLS FOR BOTH
CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL AND
PROSECUTORS-AND THE NEED FOR
SYSTEMIC STATE LAW REFORMS
Lance Cole*
I. INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have been marked by dramatic changes in the way
prosecutors investigate and charge business entities and equally dramatic changes in
the way defense counsel defend entities and affiliated individuals.' Up until the late
* Professor of Law, Eshelman Faculty Scholar, and Director of the Center for Government Law and Public
Policy Studies at the Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University. J.D. Harvard Law School.
B.S.P.A. University of Arkansas.
1 See Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New Era of Limited Liability
Entities-Should Business Entities Have a Fifth Amendment Privilege?, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1,
60-77 (2005) [hereinafter Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine] (describing recent
developments in the law of business entity criminal liability); Lance Cole, The SEC's Corporate
Cooperation Policy: A Duty to Correct or Update?, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 127, 129-39 (2013) [hereinafter
Cole, Corporate Cooperation Policy] (describing the evolution of the Justice Department's corporate
cooperation policies from 1999 to 2008); see also Lance Cole, Revoking our Privileges: Federal Law
Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL.
L. REV. 469, 534-42 (2003) [hereinafter Cole, Revoking our Privileges] (describing the cooperation
provisions of the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines); Lance Cole, Corporate Criminal
Liability in the 21st Century: A New Era?, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 147, 160-70 (2003) [hereinafter Cole,
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1990s, the investigation and prosecution of business entities had evolved into a
familiar pattern. When a company learned it was the subject of an investigation by a
grand jury or other prosecutorial authority, the company would immediately retain
defense counsel and begin to conduct its own internal investigation to "get ahead" of
government investigators and prosecutors. 2 Defense counsel expected, consistent
with Upjohn Co. v. United States,' that the findings of their internal investigation
would be confidential and could not be obtained by prosecutors or plaintiffs' lawyers
in related civil lawsuits.4 If evidence of wrongdoing by company personnel emerged,
the company's counsel would "assist" any potentially culpable individual officers
and employees and find personal defense counsel, who in almost all instances would
be paid by the company and could be expected to "work with" the company's counsel
as the investigation progressed.' The attorneys representing the company and the
individuals would then "circle the wagons" (most likely including entering into a
"joint defense agreement"' between counsel for the company and counsel for
individuals) and try to keep all potentially culpable employees and officers "inside
the tent" by asserting Fifth Amendment and other available privileges' and making
Corporate Criminal Liability] (describing the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 "up the corporate
ladder" reporting requirements).
2 See, e.g, Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and
the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 863 (2003) (describing the use of internal
investigations as a "hallmark of corporate legal practice"); see also Ralph C. Ferrara, Ann M. Ashton &
Jonathan R. Tuttle, Internal Corporate Investigations and the SEC's Message to Directors in Cooper Co.,
65 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 77-95 (1996) (describing internal investigations as an important defensive tool
providing a way to gather information through employee interviews, questionnaires, and document
review).
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-402 (1981) (expressing importance of preserving
confidential attorney-client communications).
4 See Duggin, supra note 2, at 894-98 (discussing the Supreme Court's and lower federal courts' continued
recognition that the results of internal investigations are protected by the attorney-client privilege and the
attorney work-product doctrine).
sSee Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators' Privilege and Innocents' Refuge: A New Approach to Joint Defense
Agreements, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449, 1532-33 (2002) (noting the practice of corporations
providing counsel for their employees if the employees agree to enter into a joint defense agreement).
6 See generally Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 871, 871-93 (1996) (discussing how joint defense arrangements work and the advantages they
offer); see also Cole, Revoking Our Privileges, supra note 1, at 510-13 (describing the "common interest"
or "joint defense" privilege and its limitations).
See generally Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal Documents
After United States v. Hubbell--New Protection for Private Papers?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123 (2002)
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prosecutors "fight for every inch of earth" in their efforts to obtain information that
would support criminal charges against individuals or the company.'
Despite the ever-present risk that an employee could "break ranks" and
approach the prosecutors to "cut a deal" to obtain reduced charges, or even immunity
from prosecution in exchange for providing incriminating information about the
company or its senior officials, these defense tactics worked quite well and thwarted
prosecutors' attempts to gain enough evidence to charge a company or individuals.
In fact, this strategy worked so well that near the close of the Clinton administration,
Department of Justice frustration with the success of corporate defense tactics, at
least in part, prompted then-Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder to promulgate
a memorandum setting forth a new Justice Department cooperation policy9 that
would in effect, penalize companies that employed the tactics described above.'
0 The
Holder Memorandum essentially warned corporations that to avoid harsh charging
treatment by the Justice Department, they would be required to voluntarily disclose
wrongdoing and cooperate with the Department's investigation-"including, if
necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work product protections, both with
respect to its internal investigation and with respect to communications between
specific officers, directors, and employees and counsel.""
Although the Holder Memorandum was widely criticized by the defense bar
and academic commentators, 2 its policy position was reaffirmed and expanded by
the George W. Bush administration Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson in
[hereinafter Cole, New Protection]; see also Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995).
8 See infra notes 12 and 15 (collecting relevant authorities).
' For an in-depth scholarly analysis of Department of Justice guidelines and policy memoranda, see Ellen
S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary Justice," 13 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 167 (2004).
10 ERIC. H. HOLDER, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM FROM THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
TO ALL COMPONENT HEADS AND U.S. ATTORNEYS (1999) [hereinafter HOLDER MEMORANDUM]; see
also Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle Over Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2008) (attributing the Department of Justice's success in obtaining
white collar crime convictions and guilty pleas from 2002-2006 directly to the Holder Memorandum).
" HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 10, at Section VI.B.
12 United States v. Stein, 531 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (summarizing District Court findings).
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2003.13 The Thompson Memorandum was widely perceived as creating a "culture of
waiver" and forcing the "deputization" of corporate defense counsel.14 The influence
of the Holder/Thompson waiver and deputization policies reached their zenith in
2006 in the now-infamous United States v. Stein case involving the federal
investigation of the KPMG accounting firm's tax shelter practice." In that case, U.S.
District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan held that KPMG's defense lawyers, acting at the
behest of federal prosecutors, had deprived KPMG partners and employees of their
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment by "causing KPMG to impose
limitations on the advancement of legal fees" and had "deprived the defendants of
their right to substantive due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." 6 As a
remedy, Judge Kaplan dismissed the indictments against thirteen of the defendants.1 7
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit subsequently upheld Judge
Kaplan's rulings and recognized in its analysis of the case the link between the
violations of constitutional rights by defense counsel and the Holder/Thompson
policies that the Department of Justice prosecutors were following.'
On the same day that the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Kaplan's decision in
the Stein case, the Department of Justice announced that it was effectively
abandoning the Holder/Thompson waiver and deputization policies. 9 On August 28,
" See Cole, Corporate Cooperation Policy, supra note 1, at 131-33 (describing the Thompson
Memorandum's conversion of the Holder Memorandum from advisory guidance to mandatory Justice
Department policy).
4 Id at 132 (collecting authorities criticizing the Thompson Memorandum for having created a "culture
of waiver" and having "required corporate [defense] counsel to do the government's work in hopes of
avoiding corporate prosecution of their clients"); see also Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou,
Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial
System, 43 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1225, 1240 (2006) (asserting that "the Department of Justice has embarked
on a path in which it essentially deputizes corporations to help 'catch the crooks"').
1s See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
6 Id. at 360-73.
7 Id. at 380.
18 See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing in the "Background" section at
the beginning of the opinion the Thompson Memorandum and its predecessor the Holder Memorandum,
and emphasizing language in the Thompson Memorandum explaining that a corporation's advancing of
legal fees to employees "may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a
corporation's cooperation").
9 See Jonathan D. Glater & Michael M. Grynbaum, U.S. Lifts a Policy in Corporate Crime Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at C6 ("The shift came on the same day that a federal appeals court upheld a
decision throwing out the criminal charges in a case where the tactics had been used."); see also Davis
Polk & Wardwell, White Collar Update, at 1 (Sept. 5, 2008), www.davispolk.com/files/09.05.08.Filp
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2008, Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip announced new "guidelines" for
corporate cooperation that changed prior policy by making clear that federal
prosecutors "should not ask for [corporate privilege] waivers and are directed not to
do so." 20 Although many commentators,21 including this author, 22 hailed the Filip
Guidelines as a positive step toward fairer administration of criminal justice in the
federal system, a 2015 Department of Justice policy statement again changed the
rules of engagement and placed a new emphasis on prosecution of culpable
individuals in corporate crime cases.
On September 15, 2015, then-Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates released
a new policy guidance memorandum calling for more "individual accountability for
corporate wrongdoing" in Department of Justice prosecutions. 23 The Yates
.Stein.Client.Memo.pdf ("For two separate but related reasons, August 28, 2008, was an especially
significant day for the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the white collar defense bar, and the corporate
community."); Katrice Bridges Copeland, Preserving the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 78 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1199, 1218-33 (2010) (discussing the Stein case and its aftermath and noting that the Filip
Guidelines were "a direct reaction" to Stein); Brandon L. Garrett, The Future ofSelf-Incrimination: Fifth
Amendment, Confessions, & Guilty Pleas: Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 917-28
(2008) (discussing the interplay between the coercive tactics employed by federal prosecutors to pressure
corporations to pressure their employees to provide statements to prosecutors or risk cutting off payment
of their legal fees, the Stein holding, the Filip Memo's stance on a corporation's advancing attorney's fees
to employees, and the rights of employees under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment).
20 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf; see also Cole, Corporate Cooperation
Policy, supra note 1, at 137 (describing the August 28, 2008 "Filip Guidelines" in which Deputy Attorney
General Mark Filip modified the Justice Department's corporate cooperation policy to move from a
waiver-based policy to a "new focus on obtaining facts, rather than privilege waivers"). The Filip
Guidelines also abandoned the policy of treating a corporation's advancing or reimbursing the attorneys'
fees of individual officers or employees as a lack of cooperation by a corporation. See U.S. ATFORNEYS'
MANUAL § 9-28.730 (2008), 2008 WL 5999741 ("In evaluating cooperation, however, prosecutors should
not take into account whether a corporation is advancing or reimbursing attorneys' fees or providing
counsel to employees, officers, or directors under investigation or indictment. Likewise, prosecutors may
not request that a corporation refrain from taking such action.").
21 See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 19, at 1228-33 (describing the Filip Guidelines and noting that they are
a step away from the "culture of waiver" that the DOJ's cooperation policies had created in earlier years
and a step toward preserving attorney-client privilege).
22 See Cole, Corporate Cooperation Policy, supra note 1, at 137-39 (arguing that the Filip Guidelines
were a positive step toward eliminating an unnecessary focus on privilege waivers in the
Holder/Thompson memoranda and suggesting that the Securities and Exchange Commission should
revise its cooperation policy to eliminate staff discretion to seek corporate privilege waivers so that its
corporate cooperation policy would comport with the Department of Justice policy).
23 SALLY Q. YATES, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM ON INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
CORPORATE WRONGDOING (2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter
YATES MEMORANDUM]. The Yates Memorandum was later incorporated into the U.S. Attorney's Manual.
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Memorandum drew a range of responses from practitioners and academic
commentators that ran the gamut from "not much new here"24 to "major change in
Justice Department policy."25
See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.700 (2008), 2008 WL 5999738; see also generally Douglas Jones
& Christopher J. Nicholson, The Rules Have Changed: DOJ Issues New Guidance Targeting Individuals
in Corporate Investigations, 77 ALA. LAW. 264 (2016) [hereinafter Jones, The Rules Have Changed]
(discussing the Yates Memorandum's focus on individual accountability and its "six key steps," including
the abandonment of the prior "partial credit policy" in favor of a policy where a corporation does not
receive any cooperation credit unless it identifies all individuals involved with wrongdoing, the focu1 on
individuals from the very beginning of the investigation, and the open and now routine communication
between DOJ criminal and civil attorneys); Michael P. Kelly & Ruth E. Mandlebaum, Are the Yates
Memorandum and the Federal Judiciary's Concerns About Over-Criminalization Destined to Collide?,
53 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 899 (2016) [hereinafter Kelly & Mandlebaum, Concerns About Over-
Criminalization] (discussing the two conflicting trends that have resulted from the Yates Memorandum-
increased prosecution of individuals and the federal courts' growing distaste with prosecutorial
overreach).
24 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on
Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. 51, 52-53 (2015) (asserting that the Yates
Memorandum's goal of holding individual corporate agents culpable is not a significant departure from
earlier DOJ policies); Joseph W. Yockey, Beyond Yates: From Engagement to Accountability in
Corporate Crime, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 407, 411-17 (2016) (explaining "Why the Yates Memo is No
Game Changer" and observing that "[o]verall, though, the memo represents little more than a written
restatement of how the game has always been played"); Debevoise & Plimpton Client Alert, The "Yates
Memorandum ": Has DOJ Really Changed Its Approach to White Collar Criminal Investigations and
Individual Prosecutions? 3 (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/
publications/2015/09/20150915_theyates-memorandumhasdojreallychanged its approach to wh
itecollar criminalinvestigations andindividual prosecutions.pdf ("At first glance, the Yates
Memorandum is unlikely to lead to a sea change in the pattern seen recently in criminal prosecutions of
individuals in white collar prosecutions."); Ropes & Gray Alert, The Yates Memo: Have the Rules Really
Changed? (Mar. 29,2016), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2016/March/The-Yates-Memo-
Have-the-Rules-Really-Cbanged.aspx ("The Yates Memo is not a sea change in DOJ policy but perhaps
represents a bridge farther in a long line of efforts to deter corporate crime by prosecuting culpable
individuals.").
25 See, e.g., Kelly & Mandlebaum, Concerns About Over-Criminalization, supra note 23, at 899-920
(distinguishing three of the six Yates Memorandum directives which represent a significant change from
DOJ policy and which have the potential to make prosecutors take a more aggressive approach to charging
senior corporate executives); Alston & Bird Government & Internal Investigations Advisory, The Yates
Memo and the DOJ's Focus on Individuals 3 (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.alston.com/-/media/files/
insights/publications/2015/0 9 /igovemment--intemal-investigations-advisoryi-the/files/view-advisory-as-
pdf/fileattachment/15148-the-yates-memo-and-the-dojs-focus-on-individ.pdf("The implications for this
policy shift are fairly staggering for companies, not to mention executives."); Gene Besen, The Impact of
the Yates Memo: Government Investigations Are Getting Personal 1, http://www.grayreed.com/
portalresource/Yates-Memo.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) ("Memos to all federal prosecutors, issued
from the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, signal significant policy changes.... [Private]
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While there is support for both viewpoints, two provisions in the Yates
Memorandum further complicate the already-difficult issue of multiple
representation and potential conflicts of interest in corporate criminal investigations.
Of the "six key steps" listed in the Yates Memorandum "that should be taken in any
investigation of corporate misconduct,"26 the first two are important changes from
prior Justice Department policy. The first key step requires that "[t]o be eligible for
any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department all relevant
facts about the individuals involved in corporate misconduct."2 7 This is an important
change because, prior to the Yates Memorandum, a company could in some instances
hope to obtain cooperation credit without "giving up" culpable individuals.
28 Further
shifting the investigative focus toward culpability of individuals, the second key step
set out in the Yates Memorandum requires that "[b]oth criminal and civil corporate
investigations should focus on individuals from the inception of the investigation"-
also a departure from past practice. 29
Taken together, these two new requirements alone, if consistently
implemented, will shift the focus of federal criminal investigations from entity
liability to individual officers and employees and in so doing will add further risks
to the ethical minefield that already confronts attorneys involved in investigations of
entity misconduct.30 Moreover, while the commentary on the Yates Memorandum
counsel and their clients are advised to take stock of its impact and prepare accordingly for major shifts
in prosecutorial strategy and priorities.").
26 YATES MEMORANDUM, supra note 23, at 2-3.
27 id.
28 See Kelly & Mandlebaum, Concerns About Over-Criminalization, supra note 23, at 906-11 (describing
the new "all or nothing" cooperation policy in step 1 of the Yates Memorandum as a significant change
in DOJ policy); Amelia Toy Rudolph, The Yates Memo and the Ethical and Strategic Challenges It
Presents for White Collar Defense Attorneys, 2015 WL 9183828 (Nov. 2015) ("What is different now,
with the Yates Memo, is that the stakes are higher and the requirement [is] more stark. Before, the question
was whether the corporation could receive 'full' credit for cooperation without offering up individuals.
Now, the Yates Memo makes clear that a corporation will receive no credit for cooperation at all unless
it discloses all information in its possession regarding culpable, or 'involved,' employees."); see also
Yockey, supra note 24, at 410 (describing the identifying culpable individuals mandate as at the core of
the Yates Memorandum and quoting Deputy Attorney General Yates's description of the mandate as a
"substantial shift from prior practice").
29 YATES MEMORANDUM, supra note 23, at 4; see also Kelly & Mandlebaum, Concerns About Over-
Criminalization, supra note 23, at 911-14 (asserting that the second step set out in the Yates Memorandum
is a significant change from past DOJ practice and "could significantly change the dynamics of a typical
government investigation").
"o See generally Jones, The Rules Have Changed, supra note 23, at 265-69 (discussing the focus that the
Yates Memo places on individual accountability, even from the very beginning of the investigation); Kelly
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has identified these heightened ethical risks, it has focused almost entirely on the
risks for the defense side and has not examined the potential increased ethical risks
facing prosecutors as a result of the new focus on individual culpability.I This
Article seeks to provide a more holistic analysis of the range of ethical risks
associated with criminal investigations of business entities by highlighting both
defense counsel ethical risks and the heightened risk that prosecutorial misconduct
issues will arise. The vehicle for this analysis will be the Penn State University/Jerry
Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal and the "Penn State Three" prosecutions32 of
three senior university officials for allegedly covering up Sandusky's crimes.
Although the Penn State Three case involves prosecutions under Pennsylvania
state law, and not federal criminal prosecutions subject to the Yates Memorandum,
the ethical issues presented in the case are the same issues that are likely to arise in
any federal or state criminal investigation involving a business entity. Most
importantly, it would be difficult to find a case that better illustrates a "worst-case
scenario" for ethical miscalculations in the business entity multiple representation
& Mandlebaum, Concerns About Over-Criminalization, supra note 23, at 899-916 (exploring the trend
that has developed post Yates that involves the DOJ's increased focus on individual accountability from
the outset of the investigation); Rudolph, supra note 28, at 3 ("The risk that the Yates Memo moves to the
front burner for counsel advising corporations in white collar investigations is the risk of conflicts between
the corporation and individual employees and the need for one or more of the individuals to have separate,
independent counsel."). But see Yockey, supra note 24, at 413 (asserting that "there is arguably not much
that can or should change in light of well-known practical and normative issues that affect the situation
[in corporate internal investigations]") (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., Rudolph, supra note 28, at 3 (focusing on defense perspective); Jonathan W. Haray, Courtney
Gilligan Saleski, Jeffrey D. Rotenberg & Mark A. Kasten, DOJ Seeks to Revamp and Re-Energize Its
Prosecution of Individuals: Key Takeaways, DLA PIPER (Sept. 10, 2015), http://pdf.dlapiper.com/
pdfrenderer.syc/v1/ABCpdf9/GetRenderedPdfByUrl//DOJ%20seeks%20to%20revamp.pdf/?url~https://
www.dlapiper.com:443%2Fen%2Fus%2Finsights%2Fpublications%2F2015%2F09%2Fdoj-seeks-to-
revamp%2F%3F%26pdf%3DI &attachment-false (focusing on defense perspective); Latham & Watkins
Client Alert, DOJ Guidance Prioritizes Individuals in Criminal Corporate Enforcement Actions I
(Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.1w.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-yates-memo-enforcemcnt-actions-
prioritize-individuals (focusing on defense perspective); but see Baker & McKenzie, Recent U.S.
Department of Justice Memorandum, "Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, " Targeting
Individuals May Result in Unintended Consequences (Sept. 2015), http://f.datasrvr.com/
frl/415/81176/bmgsmnt5O2Design TeamCSB41996InputClient Alert - DOJ_Memo_onCorporate
Accountability 9-19 .pdf (focusing on prosecution considerations); Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom, DOJ Issues Guidance to Prosecutors to Facilitate Individual Prosecution is Corporate
Investigations I (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/department-of-justice-issues-
guidance-to-prosecutors-to-facilitate-individual-prosecutions (focusing on prosecutorial considerations).
32 See Commonwealth v. Curley, 131 A.3d 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133
A.3d 294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Spanier, 132 A.3d 481 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
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context. This was a "multiple representation meltdown" that raised a host of serious
questions concerning the conduct, competence, and professional ethics of both the
entity's defense counsel and the state's lead prosecutors, and that ultimately resulted
in the dismissal of some of the most serious charges in the state's criminal case.
II. THE "PENN STATE THREE" CASE
A. Background and Initial Criminal Charges
Although it is too early to know the impact of the Yates Memorandum, or to
what extent the Trump administration will alter longstanding Justice Department
polices on corporate prosecutions, it is clear that the policies set out in the Yates
Memorandum increase the professional ethics risks arising out of multiple
representations of business entities and individuals associated with those entities in
criminal investigations.3 3 While one might ask "How bad can it be?" if a mistake is
made in the multiple representation context, the answer-if the Penn State Three
case is any indicator-is "Very bad, indeed!" As a cautionary tale for both defense
counsel and prosecutors, the Penn State Three case merits careful study. Moreover,
as discussed in more detail below, the Penn State Three case presents a compelling
argument for reform of both state grand jury practice rules and legal ethics
requirements to minimize the risks of professional misconduct, whether inadvertent
or calculated, by both defense counsel and prosecutors. Before examining the policy
issues presented by the case, an analysis of its procedural history and the complex
legal issues it presented is necessary.
In November 2011, a legal and public relations bombshell landed on
Pennsylvania State University when press reports revealed that a special state
3 The Trump administration appears to be shifting Justice Department priorities from corporate crime to
other kinds of prosecutions, such as violent crime and immigration offenses. See Peter J. Henning, White
Collar Watch: When Money Gets in the Way of Corporate Ethics, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/business/dealbook/when-money-gets-in-the-way-of-corporate-
ethics.html (discussing changes in the Trump Justice Department prosecution priorities and referencing
internal Justice Department memoranda by Attorney General Jeff Sessions directing federal prosecutors
to focus more on combatting violent crime and immigration offenses). The Trump administration may
also focus more on prosecuting responsible corporate officers and employees, rather than corporations,
on the theory that fines and other monetary sanctions imposed on corporations punish innocent
shareholders more than culpable corporate officials. Id. (discussing statements by Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Jay Clayton questioning "whether companies should face large fines when
shareholders ultimately pay the price for corporate penalties"). The latter would likely exacerbate the
ethical issues that are the subject of this article, and while the former might marginally reduce the number
of federal corporate criminal cases, the ethical issues that are the subject of this article will remain.
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investigating grand jury34 was recommending criminal charges against a respected
former Penn State football coach, Jerry Sandusky." Sandusky was indicted on
November 4, 2011, and he was charged with multiple counts of involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse, indecent assault, corruption of minors, unlawful contact with
minors, endangering the welfare of minors, aggravated indecent assault, and attempt
to commit indecent assault.36 On the same day, two senior Penn State administrators,
Athletic Director Timothy M. Curley and Senior Vice President Gary C. Schultz,
were also charged with criminal offenses relating to the Sandusky investigation."
Curley and Schultz were initially charged with failing to report suspected child abuse
34 For a history of grand juries and an analysis of grand jury law and practice in Pennsylvania, see Brian
Gallini, Bringing Down a Legend: How an "Independent" Grand Jury Ended Joe Paterno's Career, 80
TENN. L. REV. 705, 735-49 (2013); see also Schultz, 133 A.3d at 314-15 (describing "The Grand Jury in
Pennsylvania and the Advent of the Statutory Right to Grand Jury Counsel").
s See Sara Ganim, Charges Against Former Penn State Coach Jerry Sandusky Removed from Court
Website, But You Can Read Them Here, PENN LIVE (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/
index.ssf/201 1/11 /chargesagainst sanduskyremov.htnl (reporting that a state court website had posted
a document describing the charges, then removed it); Sara Ganim, Former Penn State Coach Jerry
Sandusky Indicted on Felony Charges of Sex Crimes Against Minors, PENN LIVE (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/201 1/l l/formerpenn statecoachjerry.html; see also
Police Criminal Complaint, Exhibit A at 24, Commonwealth v. Sandusky (No. CR-636-1 1) (Centre
County Nov. 4, 2011), http://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/SANDUSKY%20CRIMINAL%
20COMPLAINT%202422%200F%20201 l.pdf [hereinafter Police Criminal Complaint Exhibit A];
Schultz, 133 A.3d at 300. Harrisburg Patriot-News reporter Sara Ganim had previously reported, in March
2011, that Sandusky was the subject of a grand jury investigation. See Sarah Ganim, Jerry Sandusky,
Former Penn State Football Staffer, Subject of Grand Jury Investigation, PENN LIVE (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/03/jerrysandusky formerjpennsta.html. Ganim
was awarded the 2012 Pulitzer Prize for local reporting for her work on the Sandusky scandal. See Sara
Ganim and Members of The Patriot-News Staff Harrisburg, PA, PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer
.org/winners/sara-ganim-and-members-patriot-news-staff; Amy Chozick, 2 Pulitzers for Times;
Huffington Post and Politico Win, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/
business/media/2012-pulitzcr-prize-winners-announced.html.
3 Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury Presentment at 24, In re Thirty-Third Statewide
Investigating Grand Jury, No. CP-22-CR-5164-2011 (Dauphin Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 9, 2013),
http://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/SANDUSKY%20CRIMINAL%20COMPLAINT%202422
%200F%20201 I.pdf [hereinafter Presentment]; Police Criminal Complaint Exhibit A, supra note 35, at
24; Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP, Report of the Special Investigative Counsel Regarding the Actions
ofthe Pennsylvania State University Related to the Child Sexual Abuse Committed by Gerald A. Sandusky
(July 12, 2012), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/396512/report-final-071212.pdf
[hereinafter Freeh Report].
1 See Schultz, 133 A.3d at 300-01; Commonwealth v. Curley, 131 A.3d 994, 994-96 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2016); Police Criminal Complaint Exhibit A, supra note 35, at 24. See also Sara Ganim, Penn State
Officials Conspired to Protect Themselves and Jerry Sandusky, AG Says, PENN LIVE (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/20l2/l l/agsandusky coverup wasnot a.html.
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and committing perjury in their grand jury testimony during the Sandusky
investigation.38
The decision by the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office to bring criminal
charges against two of Penn State University's most senior officials was remarkable,
but the response of then-University President Graham B. Spanier to the charges
against Curley and Schultz was perhaps even more remarkable, and it foreshadowed
the far-greater turmoil that was yet to come for the University." In a move that an
3 See Information, Commonwealth v. Curley (Jan. 19, 2012) (No. CP-22-CR-5165-2011),
http://www.dauphincounty.org/goverment/Court-Departments/CurleySchultz/Curley-AG-Information-
Jan-19-2012.pdf; Information, Commonwealth v. Schultz (Jan. 19, 2012) (No. CP-22-CR-5164-201 1),
http://www.dauphincounty.org/government/Court-Departments/CurleySchultz/Schultz-AG-Information-
Jan-19-2012.pdf. Subsequently, as discussed below, they and former Penn State University President
Graham Spanier were charged with conspiracy and obstruction ofjustice, in addition to the initial perjury
and failure to report charges. See infra Section II.B.
3 At the time of this writing, the most detailed and comprehensive report on the Sandusky/Penn State
scandal is the 267-page (with exhibits) July 12, 2012, "Report of the Special Investigative Counsel,
Regarding the Actions of the Pennsylvania State University Related to the Child Sexual Abuse Committed
by Gerald A. Sandusky" authored by former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis J. Freeh and
the law firm Frech, Sporkin & Sullivan. Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 1. It should be noted, however,
that the Frech Report has been very controversial and has been vigorously challenged by Penn State
supporters for having unfairly blamed both Penn State University and former Penn State football coach
Joe Paterno for Sandusky's misconduct. See, e.g., Ken Belson, Paterno Family Challenges Accusation of
Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/l I/sports/
ncaafootball/patemo-family-challenges-accusation-of-cover-up.html; Cindy Boren, Nike's Phil Knight
Reverses Stance on Joe Paterno After Family's Report is Released, WASH. PosT (Feb. 11, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/
2 013/02/I /nikes-phil-knight-reverses-stance-on-.
joe-paterno-after-familys-report-is-released/?utm_term=.ee323e5bac3e; Mike Dawson, State Sen. John
Yudichak Questions Freeh Report, Urges Penn State to Challenge Sanctions, CENTRE DAILY TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2013) (reporting "the growing chorus ofuniversity and elected officials speaking out in defense
of Penn State and against the Frech report"); Sara Ganim, Penn State Alumni Group Releases Analysis
Critical ofFreeh Report, PENN LIVE (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/
09/penn state alumni group releas.html; Sara Ganim, Analysis: FBI Director Louis Freeh, State 's
Results Differ Greatly. Why?, PENN LIVE (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/
2012/07/analysis fbi director louis fr.html; Don Van Natta Jr.,Measured, But No Less Damning, ESPN
(Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8932633/report-family-former-penn-state-
coach-joe-patemo-strong-freeh-report. In 2015, current Penn State President Eric Barron told the
Associated Press that he believed the Freeh Report was "not useful to make decisions" and he was "not a
fan of the report" because it took a prosecutorial approach and created an "absurd" and "unwarranted"
picture of students, faculty, and others associated with the University. Mark Scolforo, Penn State
President: Freeh Acted Like a Prosecutor, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/news/sports/articles/ 2015/01/28/penn-state-president-criticizes-freeh-report-
ncaa-penalties. In March 2017, after a jury convicted Spanier of child endangerment, Freeh issued a press
statement asserting that the trial evidence confirmed all of the Frech Report's investigative findings and
that Barron should resign. See Charles Thompson, Louis Freeh, a voice long silent, erupts after former
Penn State President Graham Spanier's conviction, PENN LIVE (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.pennlive
.com/news/2017/03/louis frech a voice long silen.htmL. Although this article cites the Freeh Report for
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experienced criminal defense lawyer almost certainly would have emphatically
vetoed, Spanier issued a public statement expressing "unconditional support" for
Curley and Schultz, as well as "complete confidence" that they had acted
appropriately.40 Spanier went on to state that he was "confident the record will show
these charges are groundless and that they conducted themselves professionally and
appropriately."41
objectively verifiable information, such as the contents of documents and email communications, it takes
no position on the analysis and conclusions contained in the report.
4 The text of Spanier's initial November 5, 2011 statement was: t
The allegations about a former coach are troubling, and it is appropriate that
they be investigated thoroughly. Protecting children requires the utmost
vigilance. With regard to the other presentments, I wish to say that Tim Curley
and Gary Schultz have my unconditional support. I have known and worked
daily with Tim and Gary for more than 16 years. I have complete confidence
in how they have handled the allegations about a former University employee.
Tim Curley and Gary Schultz operate at the highest levels of honesty, integrity
and compassion. I am confident the record will show that these charges are
groundless and that they conducted themselves professionally and
appropriately
Graham Spanier, Penn State, Statement from President Spanier, PENN STATE NEWS (Nov. 5, 2011),
http://news.psu.edu/story/153819/2011/11/05/statement-president-spanier [hereinafter Statement from
President Spanier].
" Statement from President Spanier, supra note 40, at 1. Spanier's statement in support of Schultz and
Curley has had significant negative financial repercussions for the University. In October 2016, a jury
awarded former Penn State assistant football coach Mike McQueary $7.3 million in damages in a
defamation case based in part on Spanier's public statement of support for Schultz and Curley. See Marc
Tracy, Mike McQueary Is Awarded $7.3 Million in Penn State Defamation Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/sports/ncaafootball/mike-mcqueary-penn-state-
verdict.html?_r--0; see also Verdict Slip, McQueary vs. Pa. State Univ. (2016) (No. 2012-1804) (awarding
$1,150,000 compensatory damages for defamation, $1,150,000 for compensatory damages
misrepresentation, and $5,000,000 punitive damages for misrepresentation), http://co.centre.pa.us/
centreco/media/upload/MCQUEARY%20VERDICT%2OSLIP.pdf McQucary alleged that he was
terminated after he told investigators from the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office that in 2001 he
had reported an incident of child abuse by Sandusky to then-head football coach Joe Paterno, who then
reported the matter to Curley and Schultz. See Complaint at 4-8, 13, McQueary vs. Pa. State Univ. (Oct. 1,
2012) (No. 2012-1804), http://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/MCQUEARY%20VS%20THE
%20PENNSYLVANIA%20STATE%20UNIVERSITY%20COMPLAINT.pdf. In the same case, the trial
judge subsequently awarded McQueary an additional (approximately) $5 million on his state law
whistleblower claim against Penn State. See Order, McQucary vs. Pa. State Univ. (Nov. 30, 2016) (No.
2012-1804) (awarding $3,974,048 for past/fiiture economic loss and $1,000,000 for past/future non-
economic loss), http://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/MCQUEARY%200RDER%20FLED
%20NOVEMBER%2030%202016.pdf.
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The Penn State Board of Trustees met on Sunday evening, November 6, 2011.42
After the meeting, Spanier issued a press release stating that Curley and Schultz had
asked to be placed on administrative leave so that they could defend themselves
against the criminal charges.4 3 According to an investigative report prepared by
former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis Freeh for the Penn State
Board of Trustees, "several Trustees described the second press release as a 'turning
point' for Spanier" because the Board itself had decided that Curley and Schultz
should be suspended, and the Board was displeased with the wording of Spanier's
press release." The Board of Trustees met again by conference call on November 845
42 Sara Ganim & Jan Murphy, Inside Penn State Board of Trustees, Battle Brews Over Sex Scandal, PENN
LIVE (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/201 1/1 1/jerry sandusky.enn
statetrus.html. The only official record ofa November 2011 meeting is the November 11, 2011 meeting.
See Board of Trustees, Minutes of Meeting, vol. 259, at 1, Penn State Office of the Board of Trustees
(Nov. 11, 2011), https://trustees.psu.edu/pdf/november20 11minutesbot.pdf. The Board of Trustees did
not allow public access to the minutes of other meetings in November 2011. See Editorial Board, Opinion,
Transparency to Public Vital for Board of Trustees, DAILY COLLEGIAN (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www
.collegian.psu.edu/opinion/editorials/article1 17d2262-9efc-l I e6-9c62-47129c2178d2.html.
43 See Penn State, Trustees Announce 2 Officials to Step Down While Case is Investigated, PENN STATE
NEWS (Nov. 7, 2011), http://news.psu.edu/story/1 53816/2011/11/07/trustees-announce-2-officials-step-
down-while-case-investigated.
' See Frech Report, supra note 36, at 93. The Frech Report is discussed in more detail in supra note 39
and infra Section II.B.I. For information about the report and the considerable controversy it has
generated, see infra note 52.
" Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 93-94. During the conference call meeting then-Chair of the Board of
Trustees Steve Garban, who had previously worked for Spanier as Penn State's treasurer and senior vice
president for finance and operations, stepped down as Chair and was replaced by Vice Chair John Surma.
See Frech Report, supra note 36, at 94. Garban subsequently resigned from the Penn State Board of
Trustees on July 19, 2012, after the Freeh Report stated that Garban had been told by Spanier in April
2011 about the grand jury investigation of Sandusky but failed to share that information with all the other
members of the board. See Letter From Steve Garban to Karen Peetz (July 19, 2012),
https://trustees.psu.edu/pdf/garbancommunication.pdf; Letter from Karen Peetz to Steve Garban (July 19,
2012), https://trustees.psu.edulpdf/garbancommunication.pdf. See also The Associated Press, Under Fire,
Trustee Resigns at Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2012/07/
2 0/
sports/ncaafootball/penn-state-trustee-steve-garban-resigns.html.
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and in person on the evening of November 9.46 At the November 9 meeting, the
Board decided to terminate Spanier without cause.47
At the same meeting, the Board decided to terminate Penn State head football
coach Joe Paterno.4 8 The Board named Executive Vice President and Provost
Rodney Erickson as Interim President of the University.4 9
B. The Freeh Report Leads to Additional Criminal Charges
1. Background and Initial Criminal Charges
On November 21, 2011, the University Board of Trustees retained former
Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis Freeh to investigate the University's
handling of the Sandusky matter.so Freeh's report was released on July 12, 2012.1
' Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 94. See also Sarah Ganim & Jeff Frantz, President Graham Spanier
Ousted by Penn State Trustees, PENN LIVE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/
2011/11/president graham spanier also.html; Penn State, Report of the Board of Trustees concerning
Nov. 9 decisions, PENN STATE NEWS (Mar. 12, 2012), http://news.psu.edu/story/150954/2012/03/12/
report-board-trustees-concerning-nov-9-decisions [hereinafter Report of the Board of Education].
4 Report of the Board of Trustees, supra note 46, at 1; Minutes of Meeting, supra note 42, at 6. See also
Ganim & Frantz, supra note 46, at 1.
48 Report of the Board of Trustees concerning Nov. 9 decisions, PENN ST. NEWS (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://news.psu.edu/story/150954/2012/03/12/report-board-trustees-concerning-nov-9-decisions. See
Dave Sheinin, Joe Paterno Fired as Football Coach at Penn State, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/Joe-paterno-will-retire-at-end-of-penn-state-football-
season/2011/11/09/gIQAQbkb6M story.html?utm term-.494cc9ffc8b7. Paterno's termination remains a
subject of controversy and contention among Penn State supporters and detractors. See, e.g., Wallace
McKelvey, Five years after Joe Paterno's firing, Penn State trustee continues to rail against decision,
PENN LIVE (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/1 1/fiveyears afterjoe patemos.html;
see also Rodney Erickson, A message from Rodney Erickson, PENN ST. NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://news.psu.edu/story/153734/2011/11/10/message-rodney-erickson; Patriot-News, Penn State
interim president Rodney Erickson: 'This is a terrible tragedy for everyone involved', PENN LIVE
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/201 1/I I/penn state interimpresident_r
.html; Frech Report, supra note 36, at 8; David Jones, Penn State's Firing ofGraham Spanier, Joe Paterno
the First Step Toward Cleansing, PENN LIVE (Nov. 11, 2011), http://blog.pennlive.com/davidjones/
2011/11 /penn state boardoftrusteesd.html. The Board's decision to terminate Patemo has proved to
be one of the most controversial actions in the entire Sandusky debacle, in part because of the manner in
which Paterno was terminated-by a telephone call with no advance notice. See generally Will Hobson,
Six Years Later, Penn State Remains Torn Over the Sandusky Scandal, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2017
(describing ongoing controversy over Paterno's termination).
4 Erickson, supra note 48; see also Patriot-News, supra note 48.
so See Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 8.
s See Freeh Report, supra note 36, at i.
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The report was unsparingly critical of the conduct of Spanier, Schultz, and Curley,
and evidence discovered in the Freeh investigation led to criminal charges against
Spanier and additional criminal charges against Schultz and Curley.5 2 Recounting or
even summarizing the entirety of the 267-page (with exhibits) Freeh Report is not
feasible in an article of this length, so the focus of this discussion of the Freeh Report
will be the matters that are most relevant to the multiple representation issues that
are the subject of this Article.
For purposes of this Article, the most important findings of the Freeh
investigation were emails and documentary evidence that provided additional
information about the roles of Spanier, Schultz, and Curley in the Sandusky
scandal." Freeh's investigative team recovered documents and emails, previously
undisclosed and not produced to the Sandusky investigating grand jury during its
investigation, that the Freeh Report concluded were evidence of a cover-up of
Sandusky's criminal actions. 5 4 Of particular importance was an email exchange
among Spanier, Schultz, and Curley that took place in early 2001 after then Penn
State athletic graduate assistant, Mike McQueary, witnessed Sandusky sexually
assaulting a boy in the shower room of Penn State's Lasch Building athletic facility
on the evening of Friday February 9, 2001.
52 The Freeh Report also discussed the conduct of Penn State's long-serving head football coach Joe
Paterno. Paterno was not charged with any criminal offenses, and he died of lung cancer on January 22,
2012, before the completion of the Frech Report. See generally Will Hobson, Six Years Later, Penn State
Remains Torn Over the Sandusky Scandal, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2017 (noting that Paterno was not
charged and "Frech did not interview Paterno, who had died that January [2012]"). Paterno's role in the
Sandusky case remains a controversial and divisive issue, within the Penn State community and in general.
See generally DICK THORNBURGH, REVIEW OF THE FREEH REPORT CONCERNING JOSEPH PATERNO
(2013), http://paterno.com/Resources/Does/THORNBURGH FINALREPORT_2-7-2013.pdf
(criticizing the Freeh Report treatment of Paterno). In light of the fact that Paterno is deceased and was
not charged with any crimes, this Article does not analyze Paterno's involvement in the events
surrounding the Sandusky case.
" See Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 16, 50-76.
M Id. at 75.
s The 2011 Sandusky grand jury Presentment report states that McQueary told the grand jury that he saw
a naked boy, whose age he estimated to be ten years old, being subjected to anal intercourse by a naked
Sandusky. Presentment of Statewide Grand Jury at 6-7, Commonwealth v. Sandusky (Nov. 4, 2011) (No.
49-2-01), http://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/SANDUSKY%20CRIMINAL%20COMPLAINT
%202422%200F%20201 1.pdf [hereinafter Presentment 2011]; see also Frech Report, supra note 36, at
66-68; Commonwealth v. Spanier, 132 A.3d 481, 483 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Schultz,
133 A.3d at 300-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Curley, 131 A.3d 994, 996 (Pa. Super Ct.
2016). On June 22, 2012, Sandusky was convicted of indecent assault, unlawful contact with minors,
corruption of minors, and endangering the welfare of children in connection with this incident; he was
acquitted of one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in connection with this incident. Verdict
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After talking later that night with his father and a family friend who was also a
medical doctor in addition to his father's supervisor, McQueary reported the incident
to Paterno the next morning, a Saturday.56 Paterno called Curley, who was Penn
State's Athletic Director, the following day, a Sunday, and Curley and Schultz met
that day with Paterno at Patemo's home, where the three discussed the incident.5 1
Curley and Schultz then met with McQueary about a week and a half later. 8
McQueary testified that he told Curley and Schultz that the contact he had observed
between Sandusky and the boy in the showers was "extremely sexual" and he
"thought some kind of intercourse was going on."59
In their grand jury testimony Curley and Schultz described the meeting
differently. Curley testified to the grand jury that he recalled that McQueary reported
people "horsing around" in the shower, and that there was "inappropriate conduct"
Slip, Commonwealth v. Sandusky, No. CP-14-CR-2421-2011 (Centre Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. June 22,2012),
bttp://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/SANDUSKY%20VERDICT%20SLIP%20FOR%202421
%20of%2020 11.pdf; Verdict Slip, Commonwealth v. Sandusky, No. CP-14-CR-2422-2011 (Centre Cnty.
Ct. Com. Pl. June 22,2012), bttp://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/SANDUSKY%20VERDICT/`
20SLIP%20FOR%202422%200F%20201 1.pdf; see also Patriot-News, Jerry Sandusky Verdict:
Complete Breakdown of Charges, PENN LIvE (June 22, 2011), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index
.ssf/2012/06/jcrrysanduskyverdict complet.html.
s6 See Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 67; Schultz, 133 A.3d at 301; Curley, 131 A.3d at 996; Spanier, 132
A.3d at 483; Transcript of Proceedings Preliminary Hearing, Witness Joseph Paterno at 175-76,
Commonwealth v. Curley, Commonwealth v. Schultz, No. CP-22-MD-1374-2011, No. CP-MD-1375-
2011 (Dauphin Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 16, 2011), http://media.pennlive.com/midstate impact/other/
Curley-Schultz-Hearing-Transcript.pdf [hereinafter Paterno Preliminary Hearing Testimony December
2011] ("Well, I don't know what you would call it. Obviously, he was doing something with the youngster.
It was a sexual nature. I'm not sure exactly what it was. I didn't push Mike to describe exactly what it was
because he was very upset. Obviously, I was in a little bit of a dilemma since Mr. Sandusky was not
working for me anymore. So I told-I didn't go any further than that except I knew Mike was upset and
I knew some kind of inappropriate action was being taken by Jerry Sandusky with a youngster.").
s7 Presentment 2011, supra note 55, at 7.
58 Transcript of Proceedings Preliminary Hearing, Witness Michael McQueary at 30-31, Commonwealth
v. Curley, Commonwealth v. Schultz, No. CP-22-MD-1374-2011, No. CP-MD-1375-2011 (Dauphin
Cnty. Ct. Com. P1. Dec. 16, 2011), http://media.pennlive.com/midstate impactlother/Curley-Schultz-
Hearing-Transcript.pdf [hereinafter McQucary Preliminary Hearing Testimony December 2011];
Presentment 2011, supra note 55, at 7 (testifying that the meeting occurred "nine or ten days" after he
reported to Paterno and that the meeting took place at the Bryce Jordan Center on Penn State's campus);
see also Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 72.
5 McQueary Preliminary Hearing Testimony December 2011, supra note 58, at 34 ("[B]ut I would have
described that it was extremely sexual and that I thought that some kind of intercourse was going on.");
Freeb Report, supra note 36, at 72.
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that made McQueary "uncomfortable." 60 According to the grand jury Presentment
report, "When asked whether [McQueary] had reported 'sexual conduct' 'of any
kind' by Sandusky, Curley answered, 'No' twice." 61
Schultz testified that he was "very unsure about" what McQueary told him and
Curley about the shower incident.62 Schultz testified that "he had the impression that
Sandusky might have inappropriately grabbed the boy's genitals while wrestling and
agreed that such was inappropriate sexual conduct between a man and a boy."63
While Schultz conceded that McQueary had reported inappropriate sexual conduct,
he testified that the allegations "were not that serious" and that he and Curley "had
no indication that a crime had occurred." 64
In its November 2011 Presentment report, the investigating grand jury stated
that it found McQueary's grand jury testimony to be "extremely credible."65 After
recounting the testimony of Curley and Schultz, the Presentment report states that
the grand jury found that "portions of the testimony of Tim Curley and Gary Schultz
are not credible."66 As noted above, on November 4, 2011, the Pennsylvania Office
of the Attorney General charged Curley and Schultz with perjury and failing to report
suspected child abuse. 67
6 Presentment 2011, supra note 55, at 8. See also Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 72.
61 Presentment 2011, supra note 55, at 8.
62 Presentment 2011, supra note 55, at 9. See also Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 72.
63 Presentment 2011, supra note 55, at 9.
6 Id.
65 id.
6 Id. at 11.
67 See id. at 12. On March 13, 2017, Curley and Schultz each pleaded guilty to one count of Endangering
Welfare of Children, a misdemeanor of the first degree. See Guilty Plea Agreement, Commonwealth v.
Schultz, No. CP-22-CR-0003616-2013 (Dauphin Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 13, 2017),
http://www.dauphincounty.org/govemment/Court-Departments/Curley-Schultz-Spanier/Documents/
3
-
13-17%2OAmended%20Criminal%201nformation%20and%20Guilty%20Plea%20-%20Schultz.pdf;
Guilty Plea Agreement, Commonwealth v. Curley, No. CP-22-CR-0003614-2013 (Dauphin Cnty. Ct.
Com. Pl. Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.dauphincounty.org/government/Court-Departments/Curley-
Schultz-Spanier/Documents/3-13-17%20Amended%20Criminal%20Information%20and%20Guilty%
20Plea%20-%20Curley.pdf. The perjury charge, as well as subsequently brought conspiracy and
obstruction ofjustice charges discussed below were dismissed on January 22, 2016 after the Pennsylvania
Superior Court ruled that Curley and Schultz's right to counsel in their grand jury testimony had been
violated when Baldwin represented them in her capacity as Penn State's in-house General Counsel. See
Schultz, 133 A.3d at 328; Curley, 131 A.3d at 1007.
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2. The Freeh Investigation Yields Additional Evidence
The Freeh investigation yielded two important caches of contemporaneous
evidence concerning Spanier, Schultz, and Curley. In May of 2012, Freeh's
investigators obtained a file of Schultz's handwritten notes marked "confidential"
that his assistant had removed from his office after he was charged with perjury and
failure to report suspected child abuse in November 201 1.68 The file contained notes
indicating that Schultz and Curley met on February 12, 2001, prior to their meeting
with McQueary and after their Sunday meeting with Paterno, to discuss the Sandusky
matter.69 Spanier told Freeh's investigators that he met with Schultz and Curley on
February 12, 2001, and they gave him a "heads up" about a "unique" situation that
had arisen concerning Sandusky showering with a child in a Penn State athletic
facility.70 Spanier said there was no mention of anything abusive or sexual about the
situation, and that he understood that Sandusky and the child wer'e "horsing around"
or "engaged in horseplay" in the shower.71
Freeh's investigators also retrieved Penn State email correspondence among
Spanier, Schultz, and Curley that had not previously been disclosed or produced to
" Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 69-70.
69 Id at 70.
'0 Id. Freeh Report also discusses evidence showing that by February 12, 2001, after their Sunday,
February 11, 2001, meeting with Paterno but before they had met with McQueary, Schultz and Curley
had given Spanier a "heads up" about the Sandusky matter and taken several other steps, including:
reviewing a prior 1998 incident involving Sandusky showering with a child that was investigated by law
enforcement authorities, discussed at 39-47 of the Freeh Report; contacting the chief of Penn State's
University Police Department to ask whether a police file of the 1998 matter still existed (he emailed
Schultz at 9:56 p.m. on February 12 responding that the file was in the department's archives); contacted
Penn State's outside legal counsel, Wendell Courtney, Esq., to discuss "reporting of suspected child
abuse;" discussed approaching Sandusky to see if he "confesses to having a problem;" and discussed
reporting Sandusky to the board of the Second Mile charity for at risk children that Sandusky had founded.
See id at 7 1.
" Id. at 70. Patemo testified to the Grand Jury on December 16, 2011 that he told Curley via telephone
about the Saturday discussion with McQueary. See Paterno Preliminary Hearing Testimony December
2011, supra note 55, at 177-78 ("I ordinarily would have called people right away, but it was a Saturday
morning and I didn't want to interfere with their weekends. So I don't know whether I did it Saturday or
did it early the next week. I'm not sure when, but I did it within the week ... I talked to my immediate
boss ... Tim Curley . . . I believe [ did it by phone. As I recall, I called him and I said, hey, we got a
problem, and I explained the problem to him."). Curley testified that Paterno had Schultz and Curley over
to his house on Sunday, February 11, 2001 to discuss the incident. See Freeh Report, supra note 36, at 68.
Schultz testified that this meeting to discuss the shower incident occurred either at Schultz's office or
Paterno's house. See id.
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the Sandusky grand jury in response to its subpoenas to Penn State.72 One of those
emails was a Thursday, February 22, 2001 email that Schultz sent to Spanier and
Curley stating that the three would meet "at 2:00 p.m. on Sunday in Tim's office."73
Schultz's confidential file of handwritten notes contained notes of a meeting on
February 25, 2001 .7 Schultz's notes are dated but do not indicate who attended the
meeting.75  Spanier's hardcopy calendar indicates a 2:00 p.m. meeting on
February 25, 2001 in "TMC office"76 (presumably TMC refers to Timothy M.
Curley). Schultz's notes of the February 25 meeting state "(3) tell Chair of Board of
Second Mile" (with a note asking "who's the chair??"), "Report to Dept. of Welfare,"
and "Tell J.S. to avoid bringing children alone into Lasch Building"77 (presumable
J.S. is Jerry Sandusky).
According to the Freeh Report, Spanier told Freeh's investigators that the
February 25 meeting was only with Curley and that Schultz was not present.7 8
Spanier also denied that there was any mention of the Department of Welfare and
said there was no suggestion of anything about abuse or sexual contact.79
Freeh's investigators also retrieved an email exchange among Spanier, Schultz,
and Curley on February 27-28, 2001.0 Those emails are perhaps the most
controversial evidence in the entire Freeh Report, so they are quoted in full below.
At 8:10 p.m. on February 27, Curley sent Spanier and Schultz the following email
message:
I had scheduled a meeting with you this afternoon about the subject we discussed
on Sunday. After giving it more thought and talking it over with Joe yesterday-
72 See id at 73-76.
7 Id. at 72.
4 Id. at 72-73.
7 Id at Exhibit 5E.
76 Id. at 73.
n Id at 72-73, Exhibit 5E. The next day, February 26, 2001, Schultz sent Curley an email to Curley
confirming that "you've got the ball" on the three items listed in his notes and noting that he would be out
of the office for the next two weeks. Id. at 73, Exhibit 5F.
7 The Freeh Report does not indicate whether or not Spanier was shown Schultz's notes of the
February 25 meeting. Id. at 73.
7 Id.
so Id. at 74-75.
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I am uncomfortable with what we agreed were the next steps. I am having trouble
with going to everyone, but the person involved. I think I would be more
comfortable meeting with the person and tell him about the information we
received. I would plan to tell him we are aware of the first situation. I would
indicate we feel there is a problem and we want to assist the individual to get
professional help. Also, we feel a responsibility at some point soon to inform his
organization and maybe the other one about the situation. If he is cooperative we
would work with him to handle informing the organization. If not, we do not have
a choice and will inform the two groups. Additionally, I will let him know that his
guests are not permitted to use our facilities. I need some help on this one. What
do you think about this approach?8 1
Spanier responded to Curley's email later that evening, at 10:18 p.m., as follows:
Tim: This approach is acceptable to me. It requires you to go a step further and
means that your conversation will be all the more difficult, but I admire your
willingness to do that and I am supportive. The only downside for us is if the
message isn't "heard" and acted upon, and we then become vulnerable for not
having reported it. But that can be assessed down the road. The approach you
outline is humane and a reasonable way to proceed. 82
Schultz replied to the email exchange between Curley and Spanier on
Wednesday, February 28, at 7:12 p.m., with the following message:
Tim and Graham, this is a more humane and upfront way to handle this. I can
support this approach, with the understanding that we will inform his organization,
with or without his cooperation (I think that's what Tim proposed). We can play
it by ear to decide about the other organization. 83
The Freeh Report concludes that these emails, and in particular Spanier's
statement concerning becoming "vulnerable for not having reported it," are evidence
that Spanier, Schultz, and Curley decided not to report the shower incident to a law
enforcement or child protection authority because they had already decided to report
81 Id. at 74, Exhibit 5G.
8 2 Id. at 75, Exhibit 5G.
s3 Id. at 76, Exhibit 5G.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.573
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION MELTDOWN
PAGE | 603
it to the Second Mile.84 Spanier told Freeh's investigators that "the comment related
specifically and only to [Curley's] concern about the possibility that [Sandusky]
would not accept our directive and repeat the practice."" He continued, saying,
"Were that the outcome of his discussion I would have worried that we did not enlist
more help in effacing such a directive." 86 Spanier also told the Freeh investigators
that his use of the word "humane" in his email response to Curley refers "specifically
and only to my thought that it was humane of [Curley] to wish to inform Sandusky
first and allow him to accompany [Curley] to the meeting with the president of the
Second Mile." He continued, "Moreover, it would be humane to offer counseling to
Sandusky if he didn't understand why this was inappropriate and unacceptable to
us."
8 7
3. Penn State General Counsel Cynthia Baldwin Testifies
The Freeh Report states that Schultz's confidential notes about Sandusky and
the emails relating to the February 2001 Lasch Building shower room incident were
promptly provided by Freeh's investigators to the Pennsylvania Attorney General's,
Office.8 In October 2012, Penn State University waived its attorney-client privilege
with respect to General Counsel Cynthia Baldwin's representation of the University
in the Sandusky matter and, in particular, the University's compliance with
investigative efforts in the Sandusky grand jury investigation.8 9
This waiver of attorney-client privilege by the University allowed Baldwin,
who had served as the University's in-house counsel during the grand jury
investigation of Sandusky, to provide grand jury testimony about Penn State's efforts
to comply with grand jury subpoenas for documents and records relating to
Sandusky.90 Baldwin's grand jury testimony pursuant to the University's waiver of,
privilege was subject to "a caveat," however, that she would not testify about, "any
" Id at 75.
86 id.
" Id at 75-76.
18 Id at 66. That evidence helped determine that the incident, which previously was thought to have
occurred in March 2002, took place in February 2001. Id.
" See Transcript of Proceedings of Grand Jury at 3-4, Commonwealth, Thirty-Third Statewide
Investigation Grand Jury, No. 1 (Oct. 22, 2012), https://www.scribd.com/document/1 92201108/Cynthia-
Baldwin-grand-jury-proceedings-October-22-2012 [hereinafter Oct. 22, 2012 Grand Jury Transcript].
I See id. at 1-4.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.573
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 604 | VOL. 79 | 2018
of the issues relating to the testimony of Mr. Schultz and Mr. Curley and
conversations she had with them about that testimony."' The reason for this
limitation on Baldwin's grand jury testimony was that Schultz and Curley, through
counsel, had asserted attorney-client privilege "for any conversations or information
that passed between [Schultz and Curley] and Miss Baldwin in preparation for their
grand jury appearance or anything relating to their grand jury appearance."'92 Counsel
for the Attorney General's Office, Penn State University, and Baldwin proposed to
the supervising judge that Baldwin's grand jury testimony go forward but without
any questioning of Baldwin about Schultz and Curley's grand jury testimony or
preparation for that testimony.93 The supervising judge agreed that Baldwin could
provide grand jury testimony on that basis.94
Four days later, on October 26, 2012, then-former" Penn State General
Counsel Baldwin provided grand jury testimony, represented by her personal counsel
and questioned by the same Attorney General's Office prosecutor who had assured
the supervising judge of the grand jury that Baldwin would not be questioned about
the grand jury testimony of Schultz and Curley.96 Baldwin testified that she was Penn
State's first in-house general counsel, that the University had never had an in-house
legal counsel before she assumed that role, and that she served as Penn State's
9 1 d. at 4-6.
92 Id at 4 (stating to the court by counsel for the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office describing the
claims of attorney-client privilege by Schultz and Curley).
9 See id. at 10.
9 See id. at 11-14. In proposing that course of action to the supervising judge, counsel for the
Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office stated that the Commonwealth "is going to take a very clear
position as does Miss Baldwin that she was University Counsel and she was not individually representing
those two gentlemen." Id. at 11. In his closing remark to the court, counsel for the Attorney General's
Office said "I have no doubt that they will try and run the football in the middle with it but I don't think
they should get anywhere with it." Id at 14. The prosecutor's comment proved to be extraordinarily
prescient, as is discussed in detail in Section II.D below, although his confidence in the Commonwealth's
legal position ultimately proved less so. See infra Section II.D.
9s Baldwin ceased serving as Penn State's general counsel on June 30, 2012. See Oct. 22, 2012 Grand Jury
Transcript at 2-3 (discussing statements by counsel to Penn State University and Baldwin's counsel). See
also Transcript of Proceedings of Grand Jury at 6, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Thirty-Third
Statewide Investigation Grand Jury, In re Notice No. 1 (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.scribd.com/
document/192201126/Cynthia-Baldwin-grand-jury-transcript-from-October-26-2012 [hereinafter
Oct. 26, 2012 Grand Jury Transcript] (stating testimony by Baldwin that she "left on June 30").
9 See Oct. 26, 2012 Grand Jury Transcript at 5-6. As indicated in note 97, infra, other grand jury
testimony states that Baldwin ceased serving as Penn State's general counsel in June 2012, not in January
2012.
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general counsel from February 2010 until June 2012.17 Baldwin also testified that
she had previously served as an Allegheny County Judge in the Civil Division, the
Adult Family Division, and the Juvenile Division for 18 years,9 8 as a Justice of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for two years,9 9 and as a member of the Penn State
University Board of Trustees from 1995 until January 2010.100
Baldwin testified that she first became aware of the Sandusky investigation in
late December 2010, when she was contacted by the Pennsylvania Attorney
General's Office about four grand jury subpoenas.10 One subpoena was for
University documents "requesting basically any information about Jerry Sandusky
and allegations of misconduct."1 02 The other three subpoenas were "for people to
testify. Those three persons were Tim Curley, Gary Schultz, and Joe Paterno."'o3 She
testified that after she received the telephone call about the subpoenas,
I got up out of my seat and ran up the stairs to the second floor the President's
office is 208, mine was 108-to tell the President that we were receiving three
subpoenas for Tim Curley, Gary Schultz, and Joe Paterno and that there-that
they would-we would have to contact them to tell them about the subpoenas and
that I would make contact with them. 10
I tn what appears to be a mistake as to the date she ceased to serve as Penn State's general counsel, on
October 26, 2012, Baldwin initially testified that she served as Penn State's general counsel "until
January 30 of this year, 2012," Oct. 26, 2012 Grand Jury Transcript at 1-3, but subsequently in her
testimony she stated that she "left on June 30." Id. at 71. The June 30, 2012 date is consistent with
information provided to the grand jury by Baldwin's counsel and Penn State University's counsel. See
Oct. 22, 2012 Grand Jury Transcript at 2-3 (statements by counsel to Penn State University and by
Baldwin's counsel).
" See Oct. 26, 2012 Grand Jury Transcript at 5.
9 Id.
nId. at 6.
o' Id. at I 1-12.
102Id at 12.
1o3 Id
in Id- at 12-13.
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Baldwin then consulted with Spanier, and she testified that "Graham said to me, well,
you can go in with Tim and Gary and that was the conversation we had then."i'o
Baldwin also emphasized in her grand jury testimony that "there was no doubt that I
was representing the Pennsylvania State University because they were agents of the
University, I mean, very high officials ... "06
This initial decision by Spanier and Baldwin that Baldwin would accompany
Schultz and Curley to their grand jury testimony subsequently proved to be
extraordinarily important; that decision, and the legal ramifications that flowed from
it, is the central focus of this Article. The judicial decisions that analyzed the very
complex legal issues arising out of that decision are discussed in Sections II.C and
II.D below.
Baldwin testified at length about her interactions with Spanier in connection
with the Sandusky investigation and Spanier's grand jury testimony.'0 7 Of particular
relevance to this Article, Baldwin testified that during the time she was representing
Penn State University in connection with the Sandusky grand jury investigation, and
when she accompanied Spanier, Schultz, and Curley to their grand jury appearances,
she had no knowledge of the email communications and Schultz notes that are
described above.' In particular, she testified that she was "operating under the
presumption that they have told me the truth. They don't know anything else. They
have told me the truth."" She then was asked by counsel from the Attorney
General's Office "what can you tell us about Spanier's representations to you
through this lengthy period of the investigation?"II Baldwin responded, "That he
is-that he is not a person of integrity. He lied to me."' She was then asked, "Why
did he tell you the lies? Why did he say the things that he said to you?"ll 2 Baldwin's
response was, "I can't get inside his mind, but the fact is that there is no doubt he
105 Id. at 14. Baldwin also testified that "later, there was another conversation with Graham; and he said,
well, you'll go in [to the grand jury] with me." See id.
106 See id
"o' See generally Oct. 26, 2012 Grand Jury Transcript at 49-70.
'o See id. at 69.
10 9 Id.
"
0 Id. at 69-70.
. Id at 70.
1 12 d
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lied to me. I can't think of any other reason for lying than trying to hide it from
me."
4. The Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office Files New
Criminal Charges
On November 1, 2012, the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office charged
Spanier with eight counts of endangering the welfare of children, failure to report
child abuse, perjury, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to obstruct justice,
commit perjury, and endanger the welfare of children." 4 Three of the charges-
perjury, conspiracy, and one of the endangering the welfare of children charges-
were felonies." 5 The Attorney General's Office also filed new charges against
Curley" 6 and Schultz,"' in addition to the initial perjury and failure to report
suspected child abuse charges discussed above," 8 charging them with endangering
the welfare of children, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to obstruct justice,
commit perjury, and endanger the welfare of children." 9 As with the charges against
Spanier, the charges of conspiracy and endangering the welfare of children were
felonies.1 20
113 Id.
H4 Criminal Docket, Commonwealth v. Graham B. Spanier, Docket No. MJ-12303-CR-0000419-2012
(Dauphin Cnty. Magis. Dist. Ct. Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.scribd.com/document/1 11792451/Graham-
Spanier-charged-in-Jerry-Sandusky-casc.
"' See id.; Spanier, 132 A.3d at 482 n.3 ("The Commonwealth filed a single conspiracy count, which
included all of the conspiracy crimes mentioned above."); see also Sara Ganim, Ex-PSU President Spanier
Charged with Obstruction, Endangerment, and Perjury; More Charges Filed Against Other
Administrators, PENN LIVE (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssfl2012/ 1/spanier
charged with obstructi.html.
"
1 See Curley, 131 A.3d at 995.
"1 See Schultz, 133 A.3d at 300.
"1 See supra Section II.B.4.
See Curley, 131 A.3d at 995 n.3 ("The Commonwealth filed a single conspiracy count, which included
conspiracy to commit perjury, obstruction of justice, and endangering the welfare of a child."); Schultz,
133 A.3d at 300 n.3 ("The Commonwealth filed a single conspiracy count, which included conspiracy to
commit perjury, obstruction of justice, and endangering the welfare of a child.").
120 See Criminal Docket, Commonwealth v. Timothy Mark Curley, Docket No. MJ-12303-CR-0000421 -
2012 (Dauphin Cnty. Magis. Dist. Ct. Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.scribd.com/document/ 111794212/
Curley-Charges; Criminal Docket, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gary Schultz, Docket No. MJ-
12303-CR-0000422-2012 (Dauphin Cnty. Magis. Dist. Ct. Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.scribd.com/
document/1 11795193/Schultz-Charges.
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Then-Acting Attorney General Linda Kelly held a press conference to
announce the charges against Spanier, Schultz, and Curley.12' Kelly asserted that the
three had participated in a "conspiracy of silence" to cover up Sandusky's crimes:
"This was not a mistake by these men. It was not an oversight. It was not
misjudgment on their part. This was a conspiracy of silence by top officials working
to actively conceal the truth, with total disregard for the children who were
Sandusky's victims in this case."1 22 Spanier, Schultz, and Curley, through their
counsel, vigorously denied the charges. Spanier's counsel asserted that Kelly and
then-Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett were targeting him for political reasons,
asserting that "[Corbett] is now manipulating public officials and resources to settle
a personal score." 23
The new charges began what ultimately would be almost five years of legal
warfare between the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office and the three
defendants. That battle lasted until March 2017 when Curley and Schultz each
pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor charge of Endangering the Welfare of
Children and agreed to cooperate with the Attorney General in Spanier's criminal
121 Steve Eder, Former Penn State President Is Charged in Sandusky Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/0 2 /sports/ncaafootball/graham-b-spanier-former-penn-state-president-
charged-in-sandusky-case.html; Sarah Ganim, Penn State Officials Conspired to Protect Themselves and
Jerry Sandusky, AG Says, PENN LIVE (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/
11/agsandusky coverup was not a.html; University Officials Issue Statement on Attorney General's
Actions, PENN ST. NEWS (Nov. 1, 2012), http://news.psu.cdu/story/145000/2012/11/01/university-
officials-issue-statement-attorney-generals-actions
122 See CNN Wire Staff, Ex-Penn State Officials Accused of "Conspiracy of Silence," CNN (Nov. 1,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/1 1/01/justice/penn-state-scandalindex.html (quoting Kelly).
123 See Graham Spanier's Attorneys Release Statement, CBS PITT. (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2012/11/01 /graham-spaniers-attomeys-release-statement/; see also Sara
Ganim, Graham Spanier, other Penn State officials showed 'total disregard to the suffering of children,'
AG says, PENN LIVE (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/11/graham
spanier-other penn stat.html.
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trial,'24 which ended on March 24, 2017, when a jury found Spanier guilty of one
misdemeanor charge of Endangering the Welfare of Children.' 25
The most important field of battle in the years-long legal war between the
defendants and the Attorney General's office was the dispute over Baldwin's
appearance with Curley, Schultz, and Spanier at their grand jury appearances and
whether her subsequent grand jury testimony violated their attorney-client privilege.
That issue was the subject of lengthy judicial opinions, first by the trial judge in the
case holding that no privilege existed between Baldwin and the three defendants in
their personal capacities, and a second set of opinions by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court reversing the trial judge and dismissing the conspiracy, perjury, and
obstruction of justice charges against Spanier, Schultz, and Curley. Those opinions
are discussed in more detail below.
C. The Trial Court Opinion in the Penn State Three Case
On January 14, 2015, Judge Todd A. Hoover, then the trial judge in the criminal
case against Spanier, Schultz, and Curley, issued a 53-page Memorandum Opinion
and Order concluding the Baldwin had properly represented Spanier, Schultz, and
Curley in their capacity as agents of the University at their grand jury appearances.1 26
The Trial Court Opinion denied the defendants' motions to preclude Baldwin's grand
124 See Amended Criminal Information, Commonwealth v. Timothy Mark Curley, No. CP-22-CR-
0003614-2013 (Dauphin Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.dauphincounty.org/
government/Court-Departments/Curley-Schultz-Spanicr/Documents/3-13-17%2OAmended%
2 OCriminal
%201nformation%20and%20Guilty/o20Plca%20-%20Curley.pdf; Amended Criminal Information,
Commonwealth v. Gary Charles Schultz, No. CP-22-CR-0003616-2013 (Dauphin Cty. Ct. Corn. PI.
Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.dauphincounty.org/government/Court-Departments/Curley-Schultz-Spanier/
Documents/3-13-17%2oAmended%2OCriminal%20Information% 20and%2OGuilty%20Plea%20-
%20Schultz.pdf.
125 See Will Hobson, Former Penn State President Graham Spanier Convicted of Child Endangerment,
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/former-penn-statc-
president-graham-spanier-convicted-of-child-endangerment/2017/03/24/dI 936e34-109a-l I e7-9bOd-
d27c98455440_story.html?utm term=.c359070b00e5. Spanier was acquitted of a felony charge of
endangering the welfare of children and a felony charge of conspiring to endanger the welfare of children.
See id At the time this article was written, Spanier was appealing his conviction.
126 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Commonwealth v. Timothy M. Curley, Gary Charles Schultz,
Graham Basil Spanier, No. 3614 CR 2013, No 5165 CR 2011, No. 3616 CR 2013, No. 5164 CR 2011,
No. 3615 CR 2013 (Dauphin Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.scribd.com/document/
252653399/Order-on-Curley-Schultz-and-Spanier#fullscreen&from embed [hereinafter Trial Court
Opinion].
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jury testimony and to quash the 2012 conspiracy, perjury, and obstruction charges as
defective for relying on privileged attorney-client communications. 12 7
The bulk of the trial court's analysis revolved around "the scope of the attorney-
client privilege asserted by each Defendant." 28 More narrowly, the court found it
necessary to determine "whether the record demonstrate[d] the existence of an
individual attorney-client privilege between each Defendant personally and
Ms. Baldwin."'29 The court concluded that it did not.'30 While the court recognized
that the attorney-client privilege is "the most revered of our common law
privileges,"131 it also recognized that the privilege is not without cost. Specifically,
the court recognized the tension between the interests of justice that the privilege is
intended to serve and the truth-seeking function of the judicial system.1 32
The trial court began its analysis with the test set out by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Mrozek."3 3 The Mrozek test states that, before
the attorney-client privilege can be asserted, the following requirements generally
must be met:
1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client.
2) The person to whom the communication was made is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate.
3) The communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by his
client, without the presence of strangers, for the purpose of securing either an
opinion of law, legal services or assistance in a legal matter, and not for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort.
4) The privilege has been claimed and is not waived by the client.' 3 4
127 See generally Trial Court Opinion, supra note 126, at 50-52.
128 Id at 27.
129 Id
13 0 Id. at 28-29.
"' Id. at 28 (quoting Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327, 1333 (Pa. 1986)).
132 Id. at 29 (citing In re Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 86 A.3d 204, 217 (Pa. 2014)).
'3 Commonwealth v. Mrozck, 657 A.2d 997, 998 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
134 Id
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In applying the Mrozek test, however, the court recognized the difficulty in adapting
that test to the corporate/organizational entity context.' 3 5 The court recognized that
there is a difference between representing a constituent of an organization in his or
her official capacity, as an agent of a corporation, and in his or her capacity as an
individual outside of the organizational context.' 3 6 The court also noted that in the
corporate context, as is always the case in all contexts, those claiming to assert the
privilege-here Spanier, Schultz, and Curley asserting that a personal attorney-client
privilege existed with Baldwin-bear the burden of proving the privilege's
applicability. 3 1
In light of the special complexities presented by the attorney-client privilege in
the corporate context, the court recognized the need for a test that is better suited to
deal with the intricacies of representation in the corporate context and that does not
ignore the dual nature of a constituent's personality.' 38 In fact, as the court
recognized, "Pennsylvania cases, and federal cases relying on Pennsylvania law,
have addressed the standard applicable to determination of the scope of corporate
counsel's representation." 39 The court continued, "Whether there is a valid claim of
privilege exists [sic] is decided on a case-by-case basis, and applicability of the
privilege based upon the attorney-client relationship is a factual question, the scope
of which is a question of law."14 0 Ultimately, in recognition of the challenges
presented in the business-entity context, the court framed its analysis by the five-part
test for the existence of the privilege between corporate officers and corporate
counsel set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In the
Matter ofBevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp.141
"s Id at 29 (citing In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir.
1986)).
6 Id. at 30.
' Id. at 30-31.
13 1d. at31.
139 Id. (emphasis added).
140 Id. (citing In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986)).
141 In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[U]nder
existing law, any privilege that exists as to a corporate officer's role and functions within a corporation
belongs to the corporation, not the officer.").
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In Bevill the district court had used a five-part test for determining the scope of
the attorney-client privilege with regard to corporate officers in the business-entity
context:
First, they must show they approached [counsel] for the purpose of seeking legal
advice. Second, they must demonstrate that when they approached [counsel] they
made it clear that they were seeking legal advice in their individual rather than in
their representative capacities. Third, they must demonstrate that [counsel] saw fit
to communicate with them in their individual capacities, knowing that a possible
conflict could arise. Fourth, they must prove that their conversations with
[counsel] were confidential. And, fifth, they must show that the substance of their
conversations with [counsel] did not concern matters within the company or the
general affairs of the company. 142
The district court in Bevill held that the privilege belonged to the corporate entity for
all communications that occurred after the corporation retained counsel, and did not
belong to the individual corporate officers except for any conversations with counsel
that were not related to the business and assets of the corporation.1 43 The individuals
appealed the district court's decision and the Third Circuit affirmed. 1"
In affirming the district court's holding and endorsing its newly created test,
the Third Circuit, like the trial court in the Penn State Three case,1 45 recognized the
special circumstances involved in corporate representation and appreciated the need
for a specialized framework that takes these circumstances into account.1 46 Much
like the issue facing the trial court in the Penn State Three case, the key issue
addressed by the Third Circuit in Bevill was "whether the individuals' assertion of
an attorney-client privilege can prevent the disclosure of corporate communications
with corporate counsel when the corporation's privilege has been waived."' 47
In the Trial Court Opinion, Judge Hoover noted that the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court had adopted the Bevill test in Maleski by Chronsiter v.
142 Trial Court Opinion, supra note 126, at 31-32.
1 43 Id. at 32.
'Id. at 33.
145 See id. at 31.
146 See Bevill, 805 F.2d at 124.
147 Id
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Corporate Life Insurance Co.1 48 There, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
stated, "This test recognizes the distinction between the corporation's privilege, and
that of the officer or director seeking individual representation separate and apart
from corporate matters. Further, we believe that this test insures protection of
communications in which the officer or director holds a privilege. . . ."149
Ultimately, Judge Hoover understood Bevill to mean, at a fundamental level, that the
attorney-client privilege as to communications related to a constituent's role in the
corporation belongs to the corporation and can only be waived by it.'10
Judge Hoover applied the standards set forth in Bevill and found that "the
evidence fails to establish that Ms. Baldwin represented Defendants in their
individual capacities, but instead, demonstrated that Ms. Baldwin represented each
Defendant in his role as an official of the University conducting University
business."' 5 In other words, Baldwin represented Spanier, Schultz, and Curley, but
did so only in their capacity as agents of the university. Her client was not the
individual officers in their personal capacities, but rather was Penn State University.
Having reached that conclusion, Judge Hoover made relatively quick work of
the application of the Bevill test. He easily concluded that Spanier, Schultz, and
Curley all had approached Baldwin for legal advice.' 52 On the more difficult issue of
whether the officers had made it clear that they were approaching Baldwin for
representation in their individual capacities, Judge Hoover held that subjective belief
that Baldwin would so represent them was not sufficient."' In addition, they had
proceeded with her as counsel knowing that she represented the university.' 54 Judge
Hoover also noted that head football coach Joe Patemo had already retained separate
148 Trial Court Opinion, supra note 126, at 31.
1 Maleski v. Corp. Life Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
50 Trial Court Opinion, supra note 126, at 32. One commentator has gone so far as to say that, "[u]nder
Bevill, if [an] individual has [a personal legal] conversation with an attorney whom the individual knows
represents the individual's entity employer, the individual has no privilege, regardless of the
reasonableness of the individual's belief about the relationship the individual has with the lawyer." Grace
M. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Principles of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving
Harmony, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 109, 150 (2010) (emphasis added).
"' Trial Court Opinion, supra note 126, at 33.
152 See id. at 33-34.
"' Id. at 34.
154 d
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counsel to represent him personally."' These factors support the court's conclusion
that Spanier, Schultz, and Curley could not have reasonably believed that Baldwin
would be representing them individually in their personal capacities.1 6 Also, unlike
the defendants in Bevill, at the time of their grand jury appearances, neither Curley
nor Schultz nor Spanier expressed any need for individual legal advice. All three
knew that Baldwin represented Penn State University, and none of them indicated to
her that they were seeking legal assistance beyond the scope of that representation.
Third, Judge Hoover held that Baldwin could not have reasonably known that
a conflict of interest would develop in her representation of Curley and Schultz as
agents of the university.' 5 7 In collecting documents in fulfillment of the subpoena
duces tecum (which was directed to her client, the university), she was told by Curley
and Schultz that no relevant documents existed in their possession." Judge Hoover
stated:
If Defendants possessed personal knowledge which created either personal
criminal exposure or a conflict of interest, we have no evidence upon which we
could conclude that Ms. Baldwin was or should have been aware of such
information and communicated with them in their individual capacities in spite of
such knowledge. 59
Further, as noted above, the court had already found that Baldwin understood that
she was representing the university, and was representing the three university
officials only in their roles as agents of the university.1 60
On the last two prongs of the Bevill test, the trial court held that Baldwin had
maintained the confidences of the defendants in their roles as agents of the university,
and noted that the defendants had not alleged that their communications with
Baldwin had involved personal matters outside the business and affairs of Penn State
.ss Id. at 10.
1s6 See Giesel, supra note 150, at 150 (noting that, under Bevill, there is a "requirement that the individual
honestly and reasonably believe that he is seeking legal advice or assistance from a person who may
become or is the individual's lawyer").
s Trial Court Opinion, supra note 126, at 34-35.
ssId. at 34.
1 9 Id. at 34-35.
'6 Id at 10.
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University.161 Judge Hoover also held, based on this agency theory of representation,
that neither Curley nor Schultz was denied his statutory right to counsel.1 62 Baldwin
represented them in their agency capacity, and she was present with them before the
Grand Jury if they had wanted to consult with her.1 63 She had made it clear that she
represented the university,'" and supervising grand jury Judge Feudale's colloquy
complied with all applicable law.'6 5 Spanier, Schultz, and Curley appealed to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.1 66
D. The Pennsylvania Superior Court Decision in the Penn State
Three Case
The defendants' principal arguments on appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court centered on the assertion that the attorney-client privilege protected their
communications with Baldwin because she represented them individually.' They
also claimed that any limitation on the scope of Baldwin's representation
constructively denied them their statutory right to counsel before the grand jury.1 68
The Superior Court began its analysis by stating that the scope of the attorney-
client privilege is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.1 69 The court then framed
three issues on appeal: (1) whether the proper standard for evaluating the existence
of an attorney-client relationship in the grand-jury context was reasonable belief of
the client; (2) whether the trial court's agency theory was sufficient to protect the
defendants' statutory right to counsel in the grand-jury context; and (3) whether
Baldwin's grand jury testimony violated the attorney-client privilege.1 70
16 1 Id at 35.
162 Id
163 Id. at 36.
'6'Id. at 35.
161 See id at 36.
166 See Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.2d 294, 299 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Curley,
131 A.3d 994, 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Spanier, 132 A.3d 481, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2016).
167 Schultz, 133 A.2d at 299.
'168 Id
161 Id. at 312 (citing In re Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 86 A.3d 204, 215 (Pa. 2014)).
7o Id at 307-08.
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As is suggested by the manner in which the court framed the issues, the
Superior Court's analysis differed from that of the trial court in that the Superior
Court's focus was less on the attorney-client privilege in the organizational entity
context, and more on the privilege in the grand jury representation context.
Consistent with this different analytical approach, the Superior Court rejected the
trial court's application of the Bevill test, holding instead that the traditional Mrozek
test was sufficient to determine whether Baldwin represented the defendants in an
individual capacity."' The court concluded that it was not bound by its sister court's
opinion to apply Bevill in Maleski, especially because it was a single-judge
decision.'72 As such, the Superior Court held that the Commonwealth Court's
decision in Maleski was only persuasive, and described the Bevill test as "inapt."'73
In general, the Superior Court embraced a strict and arguably somewhat
simplistic view of the attorney-client privilege, largely disregarding any potential
need to tailor it to specific circumstances, including to the complexities of multiple
representation in the business entity context. 74 Specifically, the court quoted, with
emphasis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Maguigan:
The purposes and necessities of the relation between a client and his attorney
require, in many cases, on the part of the client, the fullest and freest disclosure to
the attorney of the client's objects, motives and acts. This disclosure is made in
the strictest confidence, relying upon the attorney's honor and fidelity. To permit
the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross
violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and
prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional
assistance. Based upon considerations of public policy, therefore, the law
wisely declares that all confidential communications and disclosures, made
"7 See id. at 322.
172 Id. at 321 (quoting 210 Pa. Code § 69.414 (2015)) (stating that a "single-judge opinion of this court,
even if reported, shall be cited only for its persuasive value and not as a binding precedent").
1' Id. at 322. Other courts, however, have applied the Bevill Test in the grand jury context. See In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 567 (1st Cir. 2001) (denying the privilege and holding that "an
individual privilege may exist in these circumstances only to the extent that communications made in a
corporate officer's personal capacity are separable from those made in his corporate capacity"); see also
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Bevill as support for the proposition
that "employees or officers of the corporation generally may not prevent a corporation from waiving the
attorney-client privilege arising from communications between the corporation's counsel and officers of
the corporation").
'
74 See Schultz, 133 A.2d at 313 (citing Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327, 1333-34 (Pa. 1986)).
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by a client to his legal adviser for the purpose of obtaining his professional
aid or advice, shall be strictly privileged .1.7. 5s
The emphasis the Superior Court placed on this passage is indicative of its
support for a "one size fits all" interpretation and application of the privilege. In
adopting such an approach, however, the court arguably failed to sufficiently
recognize the tension between the interests ofjustice that the privilege serves and the
truth-seeking function of the judicial system, 176 an interest that had recently been
emphasized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Thirty-Third Statewide
Investigating Grand Jury.177
The cost that the privilege imposes on the judicial truth-seeking function is not
the only issue that the Superior Court failed to address. Although the court cited In
re Condemnation by Philadelphia'7 for the proposition that the attomey-client
privilege applies to corporations with regard to communications made by agents who
act on the corporation's behalf, the court failed to recognize that in that context the
privilege belongs to the corporation and not to its agents.' 79 Instead, the focus of the
Superior Court's analysis revolved around the fact that this specific issue of privilege
had arisen in the context of an Investigating Grand Jury. It began its analysis with a
discussion of the history of the grand jury in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.' 80
The court noted that until relatively recently in Pennsylvania there was no right to
counsel before the grand jury.' 8' This changed with the passage of the Pennsylvania
" Id. (citing Maguigan, 511 A.2d at 1333-34).
'
6 See Trial Court Opinion, supra note 126, at 29 (citing In re Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand
Jury, 86 A.3d 204, 217 (Pa. 2014).
"' See In re Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 86 A.3d at 217 (In denying the petitioner's
request for a protective order protecting communications with counsel, the court recognized the tension
between "encouragement of trust and candid communication between lawyers and their clients ... and
the accessibility of material evidence to further the truth-determining process.").
n7 In re Condemnation by Phila., 981 A.2d 391 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
"Schultz, 133 A.3d at 313. It is also interesting to note that the Condemnation case was heard by the
Commonwealth Court, the "sister court" whose single-judge opinions the Superior Court dismissed as
only persuasive, but not binding, when rejecting the trial court's reliance on the Maleski Commonwealth
Court opinion. See id at 321.
so Id. at 314-16.
"' Id. at 315.
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Grand Jury Act of 1980.182 The court referenced the following language, much of it
again in bold print for emphasis:
A witness subpoenaed to appear and testify before an investigating grand
jury or to produce documents, records or other evidence before an
investigating grand jury shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel,
including assistance during such time as the witness is questioned in the
presence of the investigating grand jury .... Such counsel may be retained by
the witness or shall be appointed in the case of any person unable to procure
sufficient funds to obtain legal representation. Such counsel shall be allowed
to be present in the grand jury room during the questioning of the witness
and shall be allowed to advise the witness .... An attorney, or attorneys who
are associated in practice, shall not continue multiple representation of clients
in a grand jury proceeding if the exercise of the independent professional
judgment of an attorney on behalf of one of the clients will or is likely to be
adversely affected by his representation of another client. If the supervising
judge determines that the interest of an individual will or is likely to be adversely
affected, he may order separate representation of witnesses, giving appropriate
weight to the right of an individual to counsel of his own choosing.1 83
The court also emphasized that "[t]he supervising judge is charged with deciding
whether the witness's interest will be adversely affected by an attorney representing
multiple clients."' 4
Spanier, Shultz, and Curley argued on appeal that the statutory right to counsel
provided by the Grand Jury Act includes a right to effective assistance of counsel.1"s
Specifically, they argued that the trial court's agency theory of representation
"relieves the attorney of the duty to exercise loyalty and independent judgment, to
provide competent and diligent representation to each client, to obtain each client's
informed consent, preferably in writing, before proceeding with the representation,
182 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4549 (2017) (effective Dec. 4, 1980).
183 Schultz, 133 A.3d at 315-16 (citing § 4549).
' 8 Id. at 3 16.
18 id
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and to maintain the client's communications as confidential."'16 While it did not
directly address that specific issue, the Superior Court seemed to agree.' 87
Ultimately, the court concluded that Baldwin had not adequately explained to
Spanier, Schultz, and Curley the distinction between representing them as agents of
the University and representing them individually.'" In reaching this conclusion, the
court rejected the Bevill test relied upon by the trial court and instead applied the
Mrozek test, finding that it was "unequivocally satisfied,"1 89 and therefore that
Baldwin had breached the attorney-client privilege during her testimony to the grand
jury.190
To support this conclusion, the Superior Court noted that "Upjohn warnings"
have evolved to inform an individual that corporate counsel represents the corporate
entity and not the individual personally."' The Superior Court cited a 2009 American
Bar Association White Collar Crime Committee task force report entitled "Upjohn
Warnings: Recommended Best Practices When Corporate Counsel Interacts with
Corporate Employees."19 2 The Superior Court, however, failed to recognize that the
2009 ABA Report was by its own terms specifically intended to apply to situation-'
in which counsel for a corporation is conducting an internal investigation, acting as
an investigator seeking evidence of misconduct and interviewing company officials
as witnesses and potential wrongdoers.'9 3 That role is, of course, very different from
'' 
I d. at 317.
'1 See id. at 325.
1s8 Id.
'" Id at 323.
190 Id at 325.
'9' See id. at 314.
192 Id. at 314 (citing White Collar Crime Committee, American Bar Association, Upjohn Warnings:
Recommended Best Practices when Corporate Counsel Interacts with Corporate Individuals, 2009
A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 3, 32 [hereinafter 2009 ABA Report]).
193 See 2009 ABA Report, supra note 192, at 1. The same is true of the only other authority the Superior
Court cited on the use of Upjohn warnings, a 2010 law review article that also by its terms was specifically
addressing the conduct of internal investigations. See Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294, 314 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2016) (citing Giesel, supra note 150, at 110-11). That article begins by noting that, "An entity,
such as a corporation, occasionally asks its lawyer to investigate a particular matter. Often the
investigation requires the lawyer to interview employees, officers, directors, or other individuals related
to the entity." Id at 110. Thus, this source too is addressing situations where corporate lawyers are
conducting internal investigations-not situations, like that of Baldwin, where lawyers for the corporation
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the role Baldwin was playing when she acted as Penn State University's in-house
counsel in responding to external requests for information and testimony in the form
of grand jury subpoenas.194 This distinction is discussed further in Part III below.
Before turning to the important policy issues raised by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court's decision in the Penn State Three case, there are two additional
points in the opinion that are important and merit emphasis for purposes of this
Article. Both pertain to the conduct of the prosecutors in the case. And both highlight
the point that multiple representation situations in criminal cases do not just present
ethical risks for defense counsel-prosecutors too can find themselves accused of
serious professional ethics missteps.
First, as discussed in Section II.B.3 above, a condition of the waiver of privilege
by Penn State University was that Baldwin would not be questioned in the grand jury
about Schultz and Curley's grand jury testimony or preparation for that testimony.'
The Superior Court discussed the privilege waiver by Penn State University and
recounted the representations made to the grand jury's supervising judge by the
prosecution concerning the limitations on questioning Baldwin during her grand jury
appearance.' The court then noted that "[d]espite the foregoing representations by
[the prosecutor], a number of the Commonwealth's questions to Ms. Baldwin before
the grand jury precisely implicated potential confidential communications." In a
footnote that followed this statement, the court stated that in light of the prosecutor's
prior representations to the supervising judge, "we find his subsequent questioning
of Ms. Baldwin, absent prior judicial approval on the privilege question, to be highly
improper."'9 7
are assisting an entity client and its officials respond to outside investigations. For further discussion of
the importance of this distinction, see infra Part III.
194 The court also did not note that the 2009 ABA Report recognized that some counsel believe oral
"Upjohn warnings" are preferable to written warnings, which some counsel believe are too formal and
create the risk that "Constituents may be able to claim that they received inadequate warnings whenever
the formalized warning is not followed precisely." ABA Report, supra note 192, at 33. The latter point is
somewhat ironic, as this is essentially the result reached by the Superior Court, notwithstanding its
admonition that Baldwin had failed to follow "best practices" as described in the ABA Report.
95 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
196 See Schultz, 133 A.3d at 305-06.
197 See id. at 306 n.14. The Court also made reference to Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.10,
which provides: "A public prosecutor or other governmental lawyer shall not, without prior judicial
approval, subpoena an attorney to appear before a grand jury or other tribunal investigating criminal
activity in circumstances where the prosecutor or other governmental lawyer seeks to compel the
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Obviously, a finding by a state appellate court that a state prosecutor engaged
in "highly improper" conduct is a serious matter. Whether the court is right or wrong
in its analysis and conclusion, such a public judicial finding is an outcome that any
prosecutor would undoubtedly wish to avoid. Part III of this Article discusses the
policy issues surrounding this finding by the Superior Court and recommends
changes to Pennsylvania grand jury practice and attorney professional conduct rules
that are intended to ensure that such incidents are avoided in the future.
The final point from the Superior Court's decision that merits emphasis in this
Article also involved a finding by the court concerning the conduct of the
prosecutors. Prior to the grand jury testimony of Curley and Schultz, but after they
had been interviewed by the prosecutors (with Baldwin present) in preparation for
their grand jury testimony, Baldwin asked one of the senior prosecutors if Schultz
and Curley were targets of the criminal investigation.1 98 The prosecutor responded
that they were not targets at that time. 199 In a footnote to its opinion, the Superior
Court pointed out that at the time that statement was made,
the OAG was already aware that McQueary had told investigators that he reported
a sodomy to Schultz and Curley, and it knew that there had been no follow up
police investigation. Thus, at that time, the OAG ostensibly had a basis upon
which to charge Curley and Schultz with failure to report suspected child abuse.
Hence, this claim was misleading. 20 0
Again, for a state appellate court to find that a prosecutor in the Office of the
Attorney General made a "misleading" statement to an attorney representing clients
at a grand jury appearance is a serious matter. If the prosecutors were seeking to gain
a tactical advantage by setting a "perjury trap" for Schultz and Curley,201 then the
attorney/witness to provide evidence concerning a person who is or has been represented by the
attorney/witness." Id.
'9 See Schultz, 133 A.3d at 301-02.
'9 Id. at 302.
200 Id. at 302 n.8.
201 Experienced criminal defense lawyers who are preparing clients for "on the record" testimony in legal
proceedings, such as grand jury appearances, are very wary of allowing their clients to fall victim to a
"perjury trap." A perjury trap "is created when the government calls a witness before the grand jury for
the primary purpose of obtaining testimony from him in order to later prosecute him for perjury." United
States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Simone, 627 F. Supp. 1264
(D.N.J. 1986)). See also Bennett L. Gershman, The Perjury Trap, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 624 (1981).
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tactic backfired on them in the worst possible way. Part n11 of this Article discusses
the policy issues raised by the Superior Court's characterization of the prosecutor's
response as "misleading" and recommends changes to Pennsylvania grand jury rules
to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.
III. RECOMMENDED LAW AND POLICY CHANGES BASED UPON
THE "PENN STATE THREE" CASE
A. "Upjohn Warnings" Should Be Made Mandatory in
Pennsylvania
The fact that there was confusion surrounding Baldwin's interaction with
Spanier, Schultz, and Curley about her role in connection with their grand jury
appearances is not surprising. Neither the Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor
the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct define precisely how and when an
attorney-client relationship is formed.2 02 In seeking to clarify who is a client,
Pennsylvania courts have recognized the attorney-client relationship when the
lawyer is expressly engaged or retained to represent the client (an express attorney-
client relationship), or when the client reasonably believes that she is being
represented (an implied attorney-client relationship).203
The line between express and implied attorney-client relationship blurs when a
lawyer represents an entity, as Baldwin did in her representation of Penn State
University. Because the entity can only act through human beings, the organizational
lawyer necessarily renders legal advice to the human beings who are the
organizational constituents, including directors, officers, employees, and
shareholders acting in their organizational capacities. 21 In the course of entity
202 See Kirchner v. K&L Gates, LLP, 46 A.3d 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Cost v. Cost, 677 A.2d 1250 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996); Minnich v. Yost, 817 A.2d 538 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (recognizing the express and
implied attorney-client relationship and defining both).
203 See Comm. On Prof'l Ethics v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1971) (considering the totality of
circumstances to determine whether a lawyer and a client entered into an implied attorney-client
relationship). See also Atkinson v. Haug, 622 A.2d 983 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (considering prior
relationship between the attorney and the putative client to determine whether an implied attorney-client
relationship existed).
204 In re Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, No. CP-22-CR-5164-2011 (Dauphin Cty. Ct.
Com. Pl. Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.dauphincounty.org/Courts/CurleySchultzSpanier/April%209,%
20201 3 %2 0 0 pinion%20of%2OGrand%20Jury%2OJudge%20-%2OJudge%2oFeudale.pdf [hereinafter
Feudale's Order]. The order stated, "General Counsel hired by a corporation as an employee officer is
responsible for how the corporation's legal matters are handled. Whether a private or public corporation,
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representation, the entity's constituents can develop a mistaken belief that the
organization's lawyer also represents them in their personal capacities.2 05 The
strikingly differing analyses and rulings of the trial court and the Pennsylvania
Superior Court20 6 regarding Baldwin's representation of Curley, Schultz, and Spanier
illustrate the complexity and difficulty of this issue.
The Superior Court concluded that Baldwin erred in not providing Curley,
Schultz, and Spanier with "Upjohn warnings" making clear that she represented the
University only and did not represent them in their personal, individual capacities. 207
As discussed above, the courts seems to have taken the position that Baldwin should
the general counsel usually offers legal advice to the Board of Directors, CEO/President of the corporation
and other senior executives." Id.
205 See Paula Reed Ward, Penn State's General Counsel Cited for Missteps, PITrSBURGH POST GAZETTE
(July 15, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/state/2012/07/15/Penn-State-s-general-counsel-cited-for-
missteps/stories/201207150174. Ward asks who should and could have been considered Baldwin's client
throughout the Sandusky investigations. Id
206 A third court, the court that supervised the initial Sandusky jury investigation, also addressed this issue.
Supervising Judge Barry Feudale noted that Spanier, Schultz, and Curley were "highly educated men who
had positions of considerable influence at PSU as well as inferentially, knowledge about important events
that impact the reputation of the university; and it therefore strain[ed] credulity to infer that they were
somehow deluded or misrepresented by attorney Baldwin." Feudale's Order, supra note 204, at 12. Judge
Feudale ultimately ruled that, as a grand jury supervising judge, he lacked jurisdiction to decide whether
Baldwin's testimony to the grand jury should be excluded. However, the judge issued a sixteen-page
opinion supporting admission of Baldwin's testimony and stating that "the assertions and motions of
counsel for the defendants lack merit." Id at 7. The judge explained that "[w]hen attorney Baldwin
appeared before this court with witness Curley and Schultz, the court was aware attorney Baldwin was
General Counsel, Chief Legal Officer and Vice President of PSU," and, as such, represented the
defendants in their professional capacity. Id. at 8-9. The judge noted that he assumed Baldwin could
represent the defendants in their professional capacity because no conflict of interest between PSU and
the defendants was initially apparent. Id. at 9. To the contrary, the judge was under the impression that
the defendants voluntarily agreed to testify as friendly witnesses. Id The judge reasoned that Baldwin's
presence did not create a conflict of interest because the Office of Attorney General, Baldwin and the
defendants did not raise any objections. Id at 10. The judge admitted, however, that he did not ask any
additional questions when Baldwin introduced herself as General Counsel for Penn State University and
that he was only concerned whether Baldwin could jointly represent Curley and Schultz. Id. at 10-11. The
judge stressed that a careful review of Baldwin's grand jury testimony transcript "reflect[ed] that Baldwin
did not violate the attorney-client or work product privilege" and that, in light of the subsequently issued
Frech Report, she had been misled by Curley, Schultz, and Spanier. Id. at 12.
207 See Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) ("Ms. Baldwin did not
adequately explain to Schultz that her representation of him was solely as an agent of Penn State and that
she did not represent his individual interests."). See also id. at 325 ("Ms. Baldwin neglected to adequately
explain the distinction between personal representation and agency representation, and give appropriate
warnings to Schultz.").
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have followed the "best practices" that are recommended in the ABA Report208 on
the use of Upjohn warnings in internal investigations. The court also cited a 2010
law review article on the use of Upjohn warnings,2 09 although the court again failed
to recognize that both the ABA Task Force report and law review article, including
the specific pages cited by the court, were focused only on the conduct of internal
investigations and not on an entity's inside counsel assisting entity officials respond
to subpoenas from an outside criminal investigating body. 210
It is important to note that attorneys who are conducting an internal
investigation for a corporation interview corporate officials and employees to
determine whether those officials and employees have engaged in any wrongful
conduct. Therefore, lawyers conducting internal investigations have a special
obligation to warn the persons they interview that they do not represent them as
individuals.211 Nonetheless, the tact remains that the decision of the Superior Court
is now the law in Pennsylvania. As a practical matter, the Superior Court decision
means that providing Upjohn warnings now is not just a "best practice" in
Pennsylvania, to use the language of the ABA task force report, when lawyers
conduct corporate internal investigations. Instead, providing Upjohn warnings is
now a mandatory requirement for any Pennsylvania attorney who represents a
business entity in connection with a criminal investigation and advises the officers
and employees of the entity about the investigation. 212
208 See id at 315.
209 See id (citing Giesel, supra note 150, at 110-11).
210 See Giesel, supra note 150, at 110-11.
211 The fact that both the ABA task force report and the law review article cited by the Superior Court
expressly and only address the conduct of corporate attorneys who are conducting internal investigations
supports this assertion.
212 This is true even when the attorney provides advice about a criminal investigation of a third party,
because here Baldwin understood that Sandusky was the target of the investigation and she had been told
nothing by Spanier, Schultz, or Curley to suggest that they might have personal criminal exposure in the
matter in fact everything they had told her suggested otherwise. Cf Schultz, 133 A.3d at 323 ("The
issues communicated and addressed were not general business matters relative to the operation of the
University, but pertained to the criminal investigation into Jerry Sandusky."). Moreover, Baldwin even
specifically asked the prosecutor, immediately before their grand jury testimony, if Schultz and Curley
were targets of the investigation, and the prosecutor told Baldwin they were not targets at that time. See
id. at 301-02. As noted above, the Superior Court stated that the prosecutor's representation to Baldwin
"was misleading." See id at 302 n.8.
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Although the Superior Court focused heavily on the fact that Baldwin was
accompanying Curley and Schultz, and later Spanier, to their grand jury testimony, 213
much of the court's analysis suggests that the requirement to provide individuals
with an Upjohn warning that the attorney represents only the entity is not limited to
situations where individual officers or employees are testifying before a grand jury.
To the contrary, the overall tone and thrust of the Superior Court's analysis suggests
that an attorney representing an entity must always make clear to individuals that the
attorney represents only the entity and not the individuals in their personal
capacities. 2 14
The Superior Court stated that "communications between a putative client and
corporate counsel are generally privileged prior to counsel informing the individual
of the distinction between representing the individual as an agent of the corporation
and representing the person in his personal capacity."215 The court concluded that all
of Baldwin's communications with Schultz were privileged, 2 16 and therefore
Baldwin was precluded "from testifying in future proceedings regarding privileged
communications between her and Schultz, absent a waiver by Schultz."217
This holding leaves lawyers who represent entities, whether as in-house
counsel or outside counsel, in a position of great peril whenever their representation
involves an actual or potential criminal investigation or prosecution. To avoid the
fate that befell Baldwin in her role as in-house counsel at Penn State-being viewed
by a court as having fallen short in meeting her professional responsibilities despite
evidence that the entity officials with whom she was dealing withheld relevant
213 See, e.g, Schultz, 133 A.3d at 314 ("Underlying Schultz's claims is the extent and scope of
Ms. Baldwin's representation to him prior and during his testimony before a criminal investigating grand
jury."); see also id. at 317 n.20 ("We do note that the Commonwealth has failed to cite a single case where
a witness testified before a grand jury in an organizational or representative capacity and the testimony
offered was used to prosecute the individual in a personal capacity.").
21' See, e.g., Schultz, 133 A.3d at 323 ("Although Schultz was certainly aware that Ms. Baldwin was
general counsel for Penn State, it is unreasonable to conclude that this awareness by a lay person ipso
facto results in Schultz knowing that she represented him solely in an agency capacity.").
215 Schultz, 133 A.3d at 324 (citing PA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.2(c), 1.0(e), 1.6(a), 1.18(b)).
216 Schultz, 133 A.3d at 325 ("Schultz consulted with Ms. Baldwin for purposes of preparing for his grand
jury testimony relative to a criminal investigation into Jerry Sandusky, and reasonably believed she
represented him. . . we conclude that all the communications between Schultz and Ms. Baldwin were
protected by the attorney-client privilege.").
2171 d. at 326.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.573
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE 16261 VOL.79 12018
information from her2 '-corporate lawyers should always err on the side of caution
and provide Upjohn-like warnings to all individuals they advise in their capacity as
counsel for the entity. No prudent lawyer who is aware of the Superior Court's
holding in the Schultz case will fail to provide an Upjohn-type warning that explicitly
informs individuals that the lawyer represents the entity and does not represent the
entity officials in their individual capacities. Moreover, no prudent lawyer should
fail to document that warning, either in a contemporaneous memorandum to the file
or, if the lawyer wants to ensure that their professional conduct cannot later be
second-guessed, by having the individual official sign a document verifying that she
received and understands a warning that the lawyer represents only the entity and not
her personally.
But what of lawyers in Pennsylvania who represent entities but do not routinely
practice criminal law and are unaware of the Superior Court's decision in Schultz?
For them the decision of the Superior Court in the Schultz case represents a classic
"trap for the unwary" that may snare them in the same way it did Cynthia Baldwin.219
This is an untenable result, both in terms of the regulation of practicing lawyers and,
most importantly, ensuring that clients receive adequate representation in
Pennsylvania. Whether a lawyer-client relationship in Pennsylvania is defined in the
proper manner and the attorney-client privilege applies in accordance with
Pennsylvania law should not turn on whether the lawyer involved happens to be
familiar with a particular case decided by the Pennsylvania Superior Court-even a
case as notorious as the Penn State Three case. Therefore, the appropriate response
to the Superior Court's decision is an amendment to the Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Conduct making clear that a lawyer representing an organization must
warn the organization's individual constituents any time the lawyer provides those
218 In this case, Schultz withheld his file of confidential notes on the Sandusky matter. See supra Section
II.A.2. Baldwin testified that she believed Spanier had lied to her during her interactions with him about
the Sandusky matter. See supra Section II.A.3.
219 Baldwin was an experienced judge and a former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice with decades of
experience on the bench in private practice, at a large law firm, and as Penn State's in-house general
counsel. Despite this wealth of experience, the Superior Court did not hesitate to find fault with Baldwin's
conduct. See, e.g., Schultz, 133 A.3d at 324 ("While Ms. Baldwin could have limited the scope of her
representation during Schultz's grand jury testimony or prior thereto, there is no support in the record that
such a limited representation was adequately explained to Schultz or that he provided informed consent
to such a representation."). See also id. at 325 ("We add that Ms. Baldwin did not provide anything akin
to Upjohn warnings.").
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constituents advice about, or communicates with constituents about, a criminal
investigation or prosecution.220
The current rule on lawyers representing an organization as the client is
deficient in two respects, in light of the Superior Court's holding in the Penn State
Three case. First, the rule contains only a general admonition that, "[i]n dealing with
an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of
the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing."221 This rule, while perhaps
adequate to address situations such as a known existing or potential conflict of
interest between an organization and an individual constituent in litigation or
regulatory proceedings, is not adequate to address the situation in the Penn State
Three case. There, Baldwin was responding to a grand jury investigation that she
understood to be focused on the conduct of a third party (Sandusky), and she
subsequently testified that the individual constituents (Curley, Schultz, and Spanier),,
of the organization she was representing (Penn State University) withheld,
information from her. Without that information, she did not know and, to use the
language of the rule, could not reasonably have known, that the organization's
interests were adverse to those of Spanier, Schultz, and Curley. To the contrary, all
of their actions led her to believe that their interests and the University's interests
were aligned. The Superior Court's conclusion that Baldwin's actions were deficient
as discussed above, even under these circumstances, demonstrates that the existing
rule is inadequate.
The second deficiency in the current Rules of Professional Conduct involves:
the rule that permits a lawyer for an organization to represent individual constituentsk
of the organization if the lawyer obtains permission from the appropriate authority
220 Arguably, the same warning should be given not only in criminal matters, but in any kind of adversarial
proceeding, such as shareholder litigation or civil regulatory proceedings, where the individual faces risk
of personal monetary liability. This article does not go so far as to make that recommendation, because
the Superior Court decision in the Penn State Three case involved a criminal investigation and much of
the court's analysis was predicated on the grand jury investigation context of the case, but bar authorities
in Pennsylvania and elsewhere should consider whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision
warrants a broader Upjohn warning rule that extends beyond criminal cases.
221 PA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.13(d) (emphasis added). Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 4.3 on
"Dealing with Unrepresented Person" is also not adequate to prevent the situation that arose in the Penn
State Three case, because Curley, Schultz, and Spanier all knew that Baldwin was representing
Pennsylvania State University. See PA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4.3(c); see also supra notes 106, 154 and
accompanying text; but see supra notes 214, 216 and accompanying text.
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within the organization. 222 That rule is inadequate, in light of the Superior Court's
holding in the Penn State Three case, because it addresses only one side of the
equation-that is the need for the lawyer to obtain the consent of the organization. 22 3
The Superior Court's decision in the Penn State Three case shows that the lawyer
also must obtain informed consent of the individual constituent client224 if the lawyer
wishes to avoid subsequent controversy over the scope of the representation and
perhaps even, as Baldwin suffered, judicial opprobrium for failing to ensure that the
individual client understood the nature of the representation. At least where criminal
charges are possible, a lawyer representing an organization must provide an
explanation that the individual is being represented only in her official capacity, and
not in her personal capacity, and document that this explanation was provided and
understood, to meet the requirements imposed by the Superior Court in the Penn
State Three case.
Accordingly, Rule 1.13(e) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct
should be revised to contain the additional language suggested below, or language to
similar effect, that will make clear to all lawyers practicing in Pennsylvania what
they must do to meet the Superior Court's requirements, whether they have ever read
or even heard of the Superior Court's opinion in the Penn State Three case:
A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders. Ifthe lawyer proposes to jointly represent the organization and one
of its constituents in the constituent's capacity as an agent ofthe organization, but
only in that capacity, in a pending or threatened criminal investigation, then the
lawyer must advise the constituent of the limited scope of the representation and
document that the constituent understands the limited scope of the representation
and has consented to it.
The addition of this language would avoid the misunderstanding that occurred in the
Penn State Three case and help all Pennsylvania lawyers avoid the mistakes that the
222 PA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.13(e).
223 See id (referring to the lawyer obtaining consent under Rule 1.7 on "Conflict of Interest: Current
Clients").
224 See Schultz, 133 A.3d at 324 ("[T]here is no support in the record that such limited representation was
adequately explained to Schultz or that he provided informed consent to such a representation.")
(emphasis added).
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Superior Court concluded Cynthia Baldwin made in that case-without regard to
whether the individuals associated with the entity they represent are completely
forthcoming with the lawyer or withhold relevant information from the lawyer.
If the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct had included the additional
language proposed above at the time of the Penn State Three case, then presumably
Cynthia Baldwin would have followed those rules and explained the scope of her
representation to Curley, Schultz, and Spanier-and then documented that
explanation and their consent to the limited scope of her representation. Had that
happened, the criminal charges against them for conspiracy, perjury, and obstruction
of justice in the Sandusky grand jury investigation would have proceeded on the
merits, rather than having those charges dismissed as a result of Baldwin's grand
jury testimony and a dispute over the application of the attorney-client privilege. This
outcome would have better served both the criminal justice system and the
defendants. If the defendants were innocent of the perjury and obstruction of justice
charges, as they vigorously asserted throughout the long process of contesting the
charges, they could have defended themselves at trial and obtained an acquittal
(rather than having those charges dismissed on what might be regarded as a
technicality that left a cloud of doubt hanging over them because the case was not
decided on the merits). If, on the other hand, the prosecution's case had merit, then
the prosecutors could have proceeded to trial and put before a jury proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty and obtained a conviction,
vindicating the state's interest in prosecuting serious violations of law. Instead, the
outcome of the case is in many ways the worst of all worlds for all involved-the
prosecutors, the defendants, Baldwin, Penn State, and the criminal justice system in
Pennsylvania.
B. Grand Jury "Target Warnings" Should be Mandatory in
Pennsylvania
Amending the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct to make disclosure
akin to Upjohn warnings mandatory is one way to avoid the unfortunate outcome of
the Penn State Three case, an outcome that was harmful not only to Cynthia Baldwin,
but also to the prosecutors in the case and to the criminal justice system's interest in
having guilt or innocence decided at trial, rather than dismissed in an appellate court
ruling on a collateral legal issue. The problematic outcome of the case, which both
prevented a resolution on the merits of the conspiracy, perjury, and obstruction
charges relating to the Sandusky grand jury investigation and created a lingering
"trap for the unwary" waiting to ensnare Pennsylvania lawyers, could also have
easily been avoided in another way.
In the federal criminal justice system, the attorney-client privilege issues that
consumed the Penn State Three case almost certainly never would have arisen. The
reason is not that in the federal system, unlike in Pennsylvania, defense attorneys are
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not permitted to accompany witnesses into the grand jury room.2 2 5 The reason the
issue almost surely would not have arisen in the federal system is that the U.S.
Department of Justice has a policy of using an "Advice of Rights" form that notifies
a witness subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury if he or she is a subject or target
of the grand jury's investigation.226 The Department of Justice follows this
longstanding policy even though the Supreme Court has held227 that targets of a
grand jury investigation are entitled to no special warnings relative to their status as
"potential defendants." 2 8 Federal prosecutors are instructed that if a witness is a
target229 of the grand jury's investigation, the witness must receive "a supplemental
warning that the witness's conduct is being investigated for possible violation of
federal criminal law."230
Pennsylvania has no similar policy or rule for targets and subjects of a state
grand jury investigation. Had such rule a been in place, then the subpoenas to Curley
and Schultz for testimony before the Sandusky investigating grand jury would have
advised them that they were targets or subjects of the investigation. 23 1 If the
subpoenas to Curley and Schultz been accompanied by a warning that they were
subjects or targets of the grand jury's investigation, Baldwin would have known
immediately that there was a conflict or potential conflict between their interests and
the interests of her client, Penn State University, and she would have advised them
(and Spanier, when she "ran up the stairs" to his office to tell him about the
225 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (limiting those who may be present before the grand jury and not including
counsel for the witness among those who may be present).
226 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, § 9-11.151 [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
227 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
2211 See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 226 (citing Washington, 431 U.S. at 186).
229 A "target" is a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him
or her to the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant.
An officer or employee of an organization which is a target is not automatically considered a target even
if such officer's or employee's conduct contributed to the commission of the crime by the target
organization. The same lack of automatic target status holds true for organizations which employ, or
employed, an officer or employee who is a target. A "subject" of an investigation is a person whose
conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 226.
230 See id
231 See Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294, 302 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) ("Despite the OAG's
representation [to Baldwin] that Schultz and Curley were not targets, the OAG was already aware that
McQueary had told investigators that he reported a sodomy to Schultz and Curley, and it knew there had
been no follow up police investigation. Thus, at that time, the OAG ostensibly had a basis upon which to
charge Curley and Schultz with failure to report suspected child abuse.").
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subpoenas)2 32 that they needed separate counsel to represent them personally. Had
that occurred, the whole issue of her role in representing them in connection with
their grand jury testimony almost certainly would have been avoided from the outset,
and the criminal case against them would have proceeded on the merits with no
attorney-client privilege issues complicating the case.
Beyond serving to avoid the attorney-client privilege issue that largely
consumed the Pennsylvania Attorney General's criminal case against the Penn State
Three, there are important policy reasons Pennsylvania should adopt, either by
statute or by internal policy in the Office of Attorney General, a requirement like the
federal Department of Justice policy requiring that grand jury targets and subjects be
advised of their status as such if they are subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury.
As noted above, unlike in the federal system, in Pennsylvania the attorney who
represents a grand jury witness can accompany the witness into the grand jury
room.233 Counsel for a witness is permitted to be present in the grand jury room with
the witness during testimony and is allowed to advise the witness during questioning,
but is not allowed to make objections or arguments or otherwise address the grand
jury or the prosecutor who is questioning the witness.234 Thus, in the Pennsylvania
grand jury system, counsel for a witness is permitted to play a greater role in the
grand jury process than in the federal system, where counsel cannot accompany the
witness into the grand jury room, and the witness must ask to leave the grand jury
room to consult with counsel. 235
This more expansive role of counsel representing witnesses appearing before
grand juries in Pennsylvania makes it essential that Pennsylvania law should not
permit prosecutors to withhold information from defense counsel that would help
defense counsel determine whether a conflict of interest exists, as the Superior Court
232 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
m See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4549(c) (2017). See also Schultz, 133 A.3d at 314-15 (describing "The
Grand Jury in Pennsylvania and the Advent of the Statutory Right to Grand Jury Counsel"). As noted
above, when Baldwin appeared with Curley and Schultz, and later Spanier, at their grand jury testimony,
she informed Supervising Judge Feudale that she was appearing with them as counsel to Pennsylvania
State University and appearing with them in their professional capacity, and Judge Feudale permitted her
to appear with them for their grand jury testimony. See Feudale's Order, supra note 204.
234 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4549(c)(3) (2017).
235 As a practical matter, the difference between the role of counsel in the two systems in very significant.
By virtue of being able to hear the questions put to the witness before the grand jury and hear the responses
of the witness, counsel under the Pennsylvania system is in a much better position to assist the witness.
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concluded took place in the Penn State Three case.236 Moreover, fundamental
concepts of justice and fair play support advising witnesses prior to their grand jury
testimony if they are a subject or target of the investigation. This is why the
Department of Justice has long adhered to this policy, even after Supreme Court
decisions made clear that it is not constitutionally required.237 Finally, as a practical
matter, such a rule might help prevent overzealous prosecutors from falling prey to
their worst adversarial instincts and seeking to construct a "perjury trap" for
unwitting grand jury witnesses. 2 38
For all of these reasons, Pennsylvania law should be changed to make "target
warnings" mandatory when witnesses appear before an investigating grand jury.
Ideally, this change would be made through an amendment to the Pennsylvania
Investigating Grand Jury Act. 239 Alternatively, the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney
General could adopt an internal policy, similar to the Department of Justice policy
discussed above, requiring that target warnings be provided to grand jury witnesses
in advance of their testimony.
In addition to both preventing the kind of attorney-client privilege problem that
arose in the Penn State Three case and generally improving the administration of
justice in Pennsylvania, making target warnings for grand jury witnesses mandatory
would bring Pennsylvania into conformity with the practice of federal prosecutors
and with other of states that require target warnings. 240 In light of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court's criticism of the prosecutors in the Penn State Three case, both the
Pennsylvania legislature and the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General should
236 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing the Department of Justice policy on target
notifications).
238 See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the use of a "perjury trap" in grand jury
investigations).
239 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4549(c) (2017).
240 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-47f(e) ("The official conducting the investigation shall inform any witness
who is a target of the investigation that he is a target and shall advise him that he has the right under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Connecticut not to be compelled to be a witness,
or to give evidence, against himself."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-1l(C) ("A district attorney shall use
reasonable diligence to notify a person in writing that the person is the target of a grand jury
investigation."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-5-13 ("Before testifying or providing other evidence at any
proceeding before a grand jury impaneled before a circuit court, the subject of the grand jury investigation
shall be given adequate and reasonable notice. , . ."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-10a-13 ("A witness who is
also a target shall at the time he appears as a witness, be advised ... that he is a target."); Robinson v.
State, 453 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. 1983) (holding that a grand jury witness must be advised if he or she is a
subject of an investigation).
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recognize the need to make target warnings mandatory for witnesses appearing
before investigating grand juries in Pennsylvania.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Penn State Three case shows that current Pennsylvania law is not adequate
to protect the rights of witnesses in grand jury investigations or the public interest in
the effective administration of justice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The
case also shows that the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional conduct are not adequate
to prevent unintended ethical violations by attorneys in multiple representation
situations involving organizational clients. To address these deficiencies, the
Pennsylvania Investigating Grand Jury Act should be amended to make target
warnings mandatory for witnesses appearing before Pennsylvania investigating
grand juries. If the legislature does not act to require target warnings, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office should implement internal policies,
consistent with current Department of Justice policies for federal grand juries, to
require target warnings. In addition, the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct
should be amended to make Upjohn warnings mandatory whenever an attorney
representing an organization gives advice to constituents of that organization in
connection with a pending or threatened criminal investigation.
Until these changes are implemented, the risk remains that the mistakes
identified by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Penn State Three case-
mistakes by both defense counsel and Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General
prosecutors-will be repeated in other cases. As should be obvious after reading this
Article, every effort should be made to avoid that outcome. Legislatures, attorneys
general, and bar associations in all states should review their rules and policies in
light of the outcome in the Penn State Three case.
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